專利授權事業研究-以標準必要專利及RAND授權金為中心

atent Assertion: Focusing on Standard Essential Patent and RAND Royalty

洪堃哲(Kun-Che Hung)

指導教授 ： 劉尚志

國立交通大學/管理學院/科技法律研究所/碩士(2015年)

https://doi.org/10.6842/NCTU.2015.00868

摘要

拜近幾年高科技產業的快速發展以及全球化之賜，資訊與通訊產業漸漸趨向發展標準化、可相容性之產品。標準相容的產品除了嘉惠消費者外，更可透過網路效應（Network Effect）可以擴大市場的需求量。是以為了能使資訊及通訊產品能在全球暢通發展，標準化是高科技產業發展的大勢所需。標準化通常是透過標準制定組織（Standard Setting Organization, SSO）制定技術標準，產業界可依據技術標準發展具相容性之產品。這些技術標準無可避免的會使用到特定的專利權，這些實施技術標準所必要的專利權即為「標準必要專利」。技術標準產生後，就會對該市場產生閉鎖（Lock-in）的效果，因為實施之人難以迴避設計或採用其他替代技術。專利權人就有可能採取專利箝制（Patent Holdup）的方式，即透過侵權訴訟、聲請禁制令等方式，遲緩競爭對手的營運或是獲取高額授權金。由於競爭者或是市場參與者已經在該技術標準上投入不少成本，往往只能乖乖支付高額的授權金，或是被迫延緩或退出市場，反而有害於該技術的研發與實施。對此標準制定組織發展出包含合理無歧視即RAND承諾等政策及機制以避免專利箝制，競爭法主管機關更對標準制定提出不少的看法，美國聯邦地院自2012年之後並產生數個有關標準必要專利及RAND授權金計算的重要見解，得以一窺目前實務對於標準必要專利授權活動的看法。
研究結果發現，RAND承諾並非必然降低專利權的價值，事實上透過標準制定的參與及細緻的宣告策略，專利權人確實能透過標準制定活動達成授權事業，以保持或獲取合理之授權金回饋。

關鍵字

標準必要專利 ； 標準制定組織 ； 專利箝制 ； 合理無歧視承諾 ； 授權金

並列摘要

Bestowed by the highly development of high-tech industry and globalization, the information and communication industry tend to develop standard and compatible products. In addition to the benefit of customer, compatible product could also increase the demand of markets through the Network Effect. To achieve the worldwide development of information and communication products, standardization is unavoidable trend. Standardization is generally achieved by setting the standard through the Standard Setting Organization, SSO, and industry participators could later develop the compatible product according to the standard. These standards inevitably may include some specific patent rights, these patent rights which are essential and necessary while implementing the standards, are called Standard Essential Patents. After the standard is set, since the implementer could not design around or use other alternative technologies, the effect of Lock-in to the market will show up. Patent owner could use patent-hold technique, such as infringement litigation, injunction, to delay competitor’s pace or demand great amount royalty. Since the competitor and market participators have invested huge costs on the standard, they could only pay the huge royalty or to be delayed or even give up the market which is harmful to the development and implementation of the standard. As a result, SSO have developed many policies and mechanisms to avoid the patent hold-up issue which includes RAND commitment and others, antitrust authorities also provide their perspective toward SSO. Furthermore, after 2012 Federal Courts have made several important holding in case involving the standard patent and RAND royalty calculation, which provide viewpoint of the law practice regarding to standard essential patent.
The findings of this survey indicate that the RAND commitment is not inevitably decrease the patent value, in fact through the participation of standard setting and fine declare tact, patent owners could achieve patent assertion through standardization activity to preserve or retrieve royalty compensation.

並列關鍵字

tandard essential patent ； standard setting organization ； patent hold-up ； royalty stacking ； reasonable and non-discriminatory commitment ； RAND ； royalty

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