從股權結構觀點探討我國公司內部監控機制

The study of inside motoring systems in corporations from the prospective of the ownership structure in Taiwan

陳啟政(Chi-jeng Chen)

指導教授 ： 張心悌 ； 鄭有為

國立中央大學/管理學院/產業經濟研究所/碩士(2007年)

摘要

在歷經亞洲金融風暴之後，公司治理(Corporate governance)遂成為全球熱烈討論的議題。各國爭相引進獨立董事制度，希望藉由獨立董事超然獨立的角色，增強公司內部監控機制。然而，影響公司治理的因素包含法律、政治、經濟等，其中股權結構是影響公司治理的一項重要因素，因為股權結構正是反映出公司內部權力配置的縮影。因此，股權結構與公司治理具有相當密不可分的關係。

觀察國內公司治理上的幾個重要問題「交叉持股」、「關係人交易」、以及股權結構特性使然的「控制股東」（Controlling Shareholder），最後本文發現從股權結構的觀點出發探討我國公司治理上的核心問題。研究發現，我國許多企業的控制股東之所以可以掌握公司的經營權，並非透過持有足夠的股權，而是透過「交叉持股」、「金字塔結構」等方式取得不對稱的表決權，而使得公司之控制股東出現「股權」與「控制權」背離的現象產生，而控制股東雖然持有不到半數的股權，卻可以享有公司的經營權，因此有學者稱之為「少數控制股東結構」（controlling-minority structure）。在此種情況下，控制股東存在極大的誘因去濫用其控制權，進而做出有害於所有股東的決策。

我國在引進獨立董事制度的同時，應該考量控制股東長期控制股東會、董事會、監察人的問題。因此，本文認為應以切斷公司監督者與被監督者之間的利益依存關係為最重要之課題，再以現行監察人制度為基礎，提出適合我國的改革建議。

本文第一章為緒論，包括研究動機與目的、方法、範圍和架構；第二章從經濟學的角度與探討股權結構與公司監控的關係；第三章探討我國公司治理上的實質問題；第四章及第五章分別討論美國、日本、我國的公司內部監控制度；第六章從股權結構的觀點找出我國公司治理上的核心問題；第七章為結論與建議，本文建議突破傳統公司自治的框架，對監察人制度做修正。

關鍵字

股權結構 ； 公司治理 ； 獨立董事 ； 監察人

並列摘要

After going through the Asian financial meltdown, the corporate governance become popular topic discussed in the whole world gradually. Various countries introduce the independent director system, hope to strengthen monitoring mechanism inside the company by the independent director with independent role. However, there are many factors affecting corporate governance including law, politics, economy, etc. ,among them ownership structure is an important one, because the ownership structure exactly reflects the epitome that power disposes inside the company. So, there is a very close relation between the ownership structure and corporate governance.

There are several important problems in corporate governance in Taiwan like 「cross investment」、「related party transaction」and「ultimate controlling shareholder」which is owing to the ownership structure, finally we treat of the center problem in terms of the ownership structure. According to researches, many ultimate controlling shareholders in enterprises can maintain a complete lock on the control of a company while holding less than a majority of the cash flow rights associated with its equity, but use cross investment and pyramid structure, some scholars call that controlling-minority structure. In this situation, a controlling shareholder has great incentive to abuse his control power, and then make the decision harmful to all shareholders.

We should consider the problem that controlling shareholders control the board of shareholders、the board of directors and supervisor board when we introduce the system of independent director to our country. So, we think the most important topic is to cut off the interests between company supervisors and person supervised, and then propose the reform suggestion suitable for our country basing on the current supervisor system.

Chapter one of this essay is introduction, including research motive and purpose, method, range and structure；Chapter two discusses the relation between ownership structure and corporate governance in terms of economics；Chapter three discusses the substantive issue in corporate governance in Taiwan；Chapter four and Chapter five discuss the system of inside monitoring in company separately in U.S.A.、Japan、Taiwan；Chapter six tries to find the center problem in corporate governance in Taiwan from the view of the ownership structure；Chapter seven is conclusion and suggestion, this essay proposes breaking through the frame of traditional company autonomy and reform the supervisors system.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance ； ownership structure ； independent director ； supervisor

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