英國主併公司規模與併購利益關係之探討

Firm Size and the Gains of Acquirers in the UK

馬翠芬(Tsui-Fen Ma)

指導教授 ： 何耕宇

國立中央大學/管理學院/財務金融學系/碩士(2008年)

摘要

本論文研究英國市場中主併公司併購的異常報酬是否會受公司規模大小影響。我們分析從1996年到2005年總計共1,085件併購事件, 發現當主併者為大公司時, 其異常報酬較小公司來的顯著, 由此結果可知在英國併購市場中並沒有存在顯著的規模效果。由過去文獻中亦發現主併公司的異常報酬會受目標公司上市狀態及併購時的支付方式影響, 因此我們進一步將樣本依照目標公司上市狀態及支付方式分組, 由實證結果發現當併購目標為非上市公司以及利用混和支付方式時, 其異常報酬較其餘分類方式高, 這與管理激勵假說及流動性假說一致。在長期下, 股票表現出現反轉現象。不論公司上市狀態及支付方式為何,小公司的長期事後異常報酬較大公司來的顯著,同時附屬公司的異常報酬也較上市公司及非上市公司來的高。

關鍵字

英國 ； 支付方式 ； 目標公司上市狀態 ； 規模效果 ； 併購

並列摘要

This study examines the relationship between firm size and the abnormal returns of mergers and acquisitions in the UK. We analyze a sample of 1,085 M&As over the period 1996
to 2005. Large acquirers earn significant positive returns during the period surrounding the bid announcement. There is no obvious size effect for M&As in the UK. The gains are
also dependent on the organizational form of acquired assets and methods of payment. As a result, we sort our sample by different organizational form of acquired assets and different methods of payment. The result shows that M&As of private target and payment with mixed method gain significantly and it is consistent with the managerial motive hypothesis and liquidity hypothesis. In the long run, there is evidence that the stock performance of acquiring firms is reversed over time. The post-event long-term result for small acquirers is better than large acquirers irrespective of the organizational form of acquired assets and methods of payment. Further, the abnormal return of subsidiary target is higher than private and public target.

並列關鍵字

methods of payment ； organizational form ； size effect ； mergers and acquisitions

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