透過您的圖書館登入
IP:3.138.110.119
  • 學位論文

上游市場結構內生下的下游廠商研發決策

指導教授 : 邱俊榮 吳大任
若您是本文的作者,可授權文章由華藝線上圖書館中協助推廣。

摘要


本文建立一個垂直相關市場的理論模型,於存在可自由進出的中間財 市場下,分別探討最終財廠商在浮動價格契約與固定價格契約下的研發決 策及其對中間財價格的影響。本文發現,在浮動價格契約下,當中間財廠 商可以自由進出市場時,無論最終財廠商之研發是否會產生外溢效果,均 不會影響中間財價格。再者,在中間財市場為一可自由進出的結構下,下 游廠商研發投入會高於在上游廠商家數外生給定為一家的情況。最後,若 廠商從事研發會產生外溢效果,則隨著外溢效果增加,儘管最終財廠商的 研發投入量會隨之減少,但其產量卻會呈現先增後減的變化。上述發現均 與過去相關文獻所得之結果明顯不同。

並列摘要


This paper establishes a vertical-related model in which intermediate goods market is free entry to discuss the research and development (R&D) of downstream firms and the impacts of downstream firms’ R&D on the price of intermediate goods under floating price contract and fixed price contract.   The major findings of this paper are that: first, under the floating price contract, the price of intermediate goods won’t be affected by the R&D decisions of the downstream firms when the intermediate goods market is free entry, regardless of R&D spillovers; second, the amount of R&D under the case that the intermediate goods market is free entry will be more than that the intermediate goods market is monopoly; last, if there exists R&D spillovers, the R&D level of downstream firms will decreases but the quantities will increase at first then decrease with the spillover effects. The above results are quite different from the previous literatures’ conclusions.

參考文獻


蔡明芳 (2014) ,「垂直寡占市場結構下的最終財廠商研發誘因」,經濟論
Banerjee, S. and P. Lin (2003), “Downstream R&D, Raising Rivals’ Costs, and Input Price Contracts,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 79-96.
Czarnitzki, D., F. Etro, and K. Kraft (2014), “Endogenous Market Structures and Innovation by Leaders:An Empirical Test,” Economica, 81, 117-139.
D’Asprémont, C. and A. Jacquemin (1988), “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers,” American Economic Review, 78 , 1133-1137.
Etro, F. (2006), “Aggressive Leader,” Rand Journal of Economics, 37, 146-154.

延伸閱讀