併購交易完成後，主併公司與目標公司財務顧問延續合作之因素探討

The Reasons Why Acquirers Begin to Cooperate with Target Advisors after M&As

劉峻廷(Jyun-Ting Liou)

指導教授 ： 李韋憲

國立中央大學/管理學院/財務金融學系/碩士(2015年)

摘要

本研究著重於若過往不曾合作過的公司與財務顧問，如何在一次性的收購交易後，使得交易案中主併公司與目標公司財務顧問展開新的合作關係，我們希望找出企業在尋求新的合作銀行時，投資銀行有哪些特質將會是其考量之因素，又或者是說投資銀行能夠藉由何種管道吸引未來潛在客戶的青睞。
在本篇研究中，我們認為有三項因素將會影響過往不曾合作過的主併公司與目標公司財務顧問，在併購交易過後雙方開始展開新的合作關係，即財務顧問於交易案所提供之服務品質、目標公司於合併公司之影響力以及財務顧問之產業專業度。第一，當主併公司於交易案中觀察到目標公司財務顧問能替雇主爭取優異的收購溢酬時，未來有業務需求時將會考慮與目標公司財務顧問展開新的合作關係。第二，目標公司在併購交易案後，若能於合併公司發揮影響力將對主併公司與目標公司財務顧問未來是否進行合作有正向關係，而目標公司若能於併購交易中獲得越多股權，則越能在合併公司中保持其影響力。第三，目標公司財務顧問所擁有的產業專精度，將成為未來是否有機會與主併公司產生新的合作契機之關鍵因素。 本研究總共有1,414筆目標公司財務顧問過去未曾與主併公司有過合作關係之併購交易案，樣本期間為1,989-2012年。實證結果顯示，主併公司與目標公司財務顧問未來是否進行合作之機率與目標公司收購溢酬、目標公司宣告溢酬與目標公司財務顧問產業專精擁有顯著正向關係，而與交易案之現金支付比率則有顯著負向關係。

關鍵字

收購案 ； 專業服務 ； 產業專精 ； 影響力 ； 目標公司財務顧問 ； 合作機率

並列摘要

This paper studies reasons why combined firm to hire target advisor after finishing M&A deals when there is no prior relationship between acquirer and target’s financial advisor. Thus it shed lights on not only what firms take into account when they seek for potential business partner but also how investment banks can attract potential clients.
In this study, I document evidence supporting three potential reasons factors contributing the relationship between the acquirer and the target’s financial advisor after the deal completion: the quality of the service during the deal, the influential power of the target management in combined firm, and industry expertise of target advisor. First, acquirers may observe the service quality target’s advisor provided during the deal and take in account for hiring the same advisor for future business. Second, the influential power of target management could positively affect the decision of combined firm hiring target advisor in the future. When the target firms got more stock as payment, target management is more likely to stay in the combined firm with their influential power. Third, target advisor’s industry expertise will play a key role on whether combined firms hire it M&As. Using a sample of 1,414 acquisitions from 1989 to 2012 where the target advisor had no prior relationship with acquirer. I show that the probability of being hired by combined firm is positively related to target premium, target announcement returns, and target advisor’s industry expertise and is negatively related to the portion of cash payment.

並列關鍵字

M&A ； industry expertise ； influence ； target advisor ； probability of cooperation

參考文獻

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