2008年全球金融海嘯後,各國知名大型企業面臨破產的命運,並要求政府協助企業紓困,此時高階主管與董監事們沒能共體時艱反而坐領高薪,公司治理機制顯然沒有發揮作用,使得肥貓議題備受全球重視,其重點在於高階主管薪酬與公司營運績效不成正比所致,全球便形成一股打擊肥貓的風潮。 怎樣的公司治理機制才是妥當的呢?為挽回投資人的信心,應由客觀且公正的第三單位進行評估,強化企業公司治理並提升資訊透明度,減少搜尋成本與資訊不對稱的情形,以利投資人了解公司治理的真正成果與品質,使得公司治理品質不論是對企業、股東及投資人都有極其的重要性。另外為避免前視偏誤的發生,本研究係以未來營運績效替代當期績效,針對公司治理品質、高階主管薪酬與未來營運績效三者之關係進行研究。 本研究係針對台灣製造業上市櫃公司為研究對象,橫跨2005年至2010年六個年度研究年度進行迴歸分析,探討公司治理品質對未來營運績效之關係、高階主管薪酬與未來營運績效之關係外,另並以階層迴歸分析討論公司治理品質與高階主管薪酬是否具有交互作用,並探討其與未來營運績效之關係。本研究實證結果如下: 一、 公司治理品質愈高的公司,其未來營運績效愈佳。 二、 高階主管薪酬愈高時,其未來營運績效愈佳。 三、 公司治理品質與高階主管薪酬間之交互作用,對未來營運績效有負向顯著影響。 實證研究結果得知,公司治理品質、高階主管薪酬確實可為企業提升未來營運績效,而公司治理品質與高階主管之交互作用對未來績效呈負向顯著性。亦即公司發揮監督機制,在治理品質較佳且抑制高階主管超額薪酬的企業,可避免管理者自利動機行為,降低代理問題的發生,有助於提升未來績效。
After the financial tsunami, the corporate governance mechanism seems to have been unable to play its effectiveness. In order to restore investor confidence, the corporate governance mechanism should evaluate and strengthen through the evaluation of objective and impartial institution. The evaluation mechanism can enhance the transparency of information and reducing search costs and information asymmetry. It makes investors' to understand the real meaning and quality of corporate governance. In our study, in addition to avoid the look-ahead bias, we use future performance rather than contemporaneous performance to reflect the effect of corporate governance, and then discuss the relationships among corporate governance quality, executive compensation and future operating performance. In this study, samples are selected from manufacturing industry listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2010. We use regression analysis to figure the relationship between the quality of corporate governance and future performance, and the relationship between executive compensation and future performance. We also use the hierarchical regression to analyze whether the existence of interaction between corporate governance quality and executive compensation effect on future performance. The empirical results are as follows: First, the company with higher quality score of corporate governance showed the better future performance. Second, the higher executive compensation also showed the better future performance. Third, there is really existence of interaction between corporate governance quality and executive compensation effect on future performance. Empirical results reveal that the higher quality of corporate governance or executive compensation does enhance the enterprises’ future operating performance and the interaction between corporate governance quality and executive compensation had negative significant with future performance.