- 學位論文
Defending Minimalist Republicanism : Realizing the project of Public Justification Robustly
Defending Minimalist Republicanism : Realizing the project of Public Justification Robustly
摘要
本論文旨在辯護極小化的共和主義（minimalist republicanism），以穩健實現公共証成計畫。本文認為，當代主要辯護公民共和主義或者實際上有在辯護非宰制自由觀的學者都無法有效果地克服公共証成的問題。例如，由於裴迪特（P. Pettit）的非宰制自由觀無法穩定處理多元主義的問題，這使得他所主張的共和主義將無法充分解決國家宰制問題。另一方面，雖然羅爾斯（J. Rawls）沒有充分界定非宰制的自由觀，但是，他在後期的政治自由主義中採取獨特的政治轉向，這使得政治自由主義原有克服穩定性問題的目標，轉而可解讀為克服宰制問題。但是，即使如此，羅爾斯的政治自由主義會因為預設政治與道德立場，而仍然無法成功解決國家宰制的問題。 有鑑於此，本文將藉由論證極小化的共和主義，以解決國家宰制的問題，同時希望克服公共証成的困難。在邁向極小化共和主義的過程中，我認為任何支持這種共和主義的人至少必要順利回應四個相當基本的問題。 首先，如何界定宰制本身的問題。根據裴迪特，宰制是指任何擁有任意干涉能力的行動者，不論行動者是個人或者團體。宰制者有能力對被宰制者的自由選項產生不正常的影響，這使得被宰制的利益與意見受制於宰制者的意志判斷。但是，我認為，這種界定宰制的方式過於廣泛且不穩定，這使得我們需要另外建立起對於宰制的想像。當代消極自由理論家，如史戴納（H. Steiner）、卡特（I. Carter）與克萊姆爾（M. Kramer）認為，所謂的非宰制的自由觀其實是另一種更為精緻的非干涉的自由觀。自由的概念仍然如柏林（I. Berlin）所言只有兩種，即非干涉的自由觀與自我掌控。但是，我認為，當代消極自由理論家對於宰制的想法過於單純，我們仍然有必要發展更適切的宰制觀。 第二，宰制的適用範圍的問題。我認為，所謂宰制應該指的是那些沒有受制於公共懲罰機制，如法律或者有效果的公共規範，而有能力對他人的基本選項行使任意權力的行動者。這種對於宰制的界定會較為準確。在這個宰制觀之下，國家成為唯一的宰制來源，所謂的宰制問題應該限定為國家是否有宰制公民的情況，這有別於裴迪特或者一般公民共和主義者所認定的宰制可區分為社會宰制與國家宰制。國家宰制是個人自由不僅是最大，且是唯一的威脅。另一方面，如果國家有對公民宰制，這個意思是說國家是針對公民的基本自由擁有任意權力，而非所有個人自由。主要理由在於，基本自由不僅較為明確，且更能與多元主義的事實相容。 第三，如何克服宰制的問題。根據極小化的共和主義，如何避免國家去宰制公民勢必端視法律、憲政民主制度與公共規範能否在保障個人基本自由的領域中產生效果。如果國家無法保障個人的基本自由，則國家的行動會是沒有效果的。如果國家有確實保證個人的基本自由，則國家的行動有其效果的（effective）。但是，在此所謂的有效果並不完全意指國家力量的壓迫特性，我們似乎常常可以看到國家的行動是有其效果的結果不見得只是依賴具有實用性的國家力量。原則上，如果國家行動有其效果，則這種成效性除了可行性之外，至少還需要三種條件，一是可課責性，二是公開性，三是可維持正常生活。如果國家的行動沒有具備上述四種條件，則國家行動就不能稱作有效果的。 第四，公共証成的疑慮與解決。假定極小化的共和主義可以為所有公民合理接受，則這種合理性在於「保証有效果」，即保證國家確實在保障個人基本自由的工作有其成效。這種保証有效果不同於羅爾斯所言的，保證國家的確在保障個人基本自由的工作上有其「效力」（validity）。對於政治自由主義者而言，這種保證有效力的說法已經預設特定政治傳統，如羅爾斯自己主張的社會契約論的想法，這使得國家不可避免地會去任意干涉其他非特定政治傳統的想法。國家的政治正當性同樣不可避免地會遭遇困難。 反觀主張極小化共和主義者則不會遭遇類似的困境。因為極小化共和主義者並不去預設任何特定政治傳統，這使得國家所做出的政治決定更有其開放性與穩定性。因為任何合理的人會不斷提出與遵守「有效果的共同理由」，以取代政治自由主義者慣用的「公共理由」。國家的政治正當性在富有成效的共同理由的影響之下更有適切的基礎。雖然高斯與迪亞高斯迪諾試圖替政治自由主義開發另外更妥當的解決之道，但是，他們各自的解決之道都有無法克服的弱點。由此看來，極小化的共和主義比起政治自由主義似乎更值得為人合理接受。我們對於公共証成的疑慮可以透過極小化的共和主義而得到解消。 我相信，如果極小化的共和主義可以順利回應上述四個問題，則公共証成計畫可以穩健地實現。同時，極小化的共和主義也可以在回答提問的過程中，直接或者間接地反駁了其他試圖解決上述問題的競爭學說，即當代消極自由理論、以史金納與裴迪特為首的公民共和主義，以及以羅爾斯為首的政治自由主義。
並列摘要
My thesis is to defend minimal republicanism so as to robustly realize the project of public justification. But there are three major challenges for minimalist republicans to meet. The first is from the pure negative theorists, the second is from Skinner-Pettit Style republicans and the third is from political liberals led by Rawls. If minimalist republicans can respond to the four questions raised by those competing counterparts, then I believe minimalist republicanism is reasonably justified. First of all, if the concept of domination is of most importance for civic republicans, then how to best understand the conception of it should be the top priority. According to Pettit, domination is the power relationship between master and slave. The master has a capacity to interfere with the slave in all or relevant choices on an arbitrary basis. The master or the slave can be individual or corporate agents. But such definition is too broad and instable to be able to justify his republicanism. I contend that minimalist republicanism can provide a clearer and a better definition. For minimalist republicans, domination should be grasped in a more restricted way. Namely, if A is dominated by B, then domination should be defined as follows： 1. B has a capacity to interfere that is not to subject to public penalties sufficient to discourage its exercise, 2. on an arbitrary basis, 3. in basic choices that A is in a position to make. Secondly, if domination can be interpreted as above, then we may tell the difference between Pettit’s definition and mine. There are two points to make. One is that Pettit thinks domination would exist in social and political spheres. But I think for minimalist republicans, domination only exists in political domain. That means only state domination is their focus, not including social domination. The other is that Pettit argues that all or relevant choices are the target for the dominator to interfere with. But I insist that only the basic choices should be the real object in such unequal relationship. Pettit’s way of thinking would result in uncertain or ineffective solution. Besides, my view is more attractive to citizens of different backgrounds in pluralistic modern world. However, the contemporary pure negative theorists might argue that domination should be reduced to interference. Steiner, Carter and Kramer all favor such a position. Briefly speaking, they argue that unfreedom is just contingently connected with power. After all, freedom means personal choices which would not be actually prevented by others. The so-called domination should be known as overall freedom which cannot be obtained. For example, the highwayman threatens John and says “your money or your life”. Carter and Kramer would judge that John is still free to keep money or life, but he cannot own money and life both so John is dominated in such a sense. In spite of this challenge, I would still argue that domination and interference are two different concepts and domination is much worse than interference. Non-domination cannot be reduced to non-interference. Thirdly, how to avoid domination is another important question. According to minimalist republicanism, there are three sources to fight against state domination. One is laws, another is the constitutional democracy, and the other is civic norms. I think these are the effective channels to protect individual or group basic liberties against state domination. Why are these three sources effective？There are four reasons for this effectiveness. 1. Feasibility, 2. Accountability, 3. Publicity, 4. The ability to maintain the normal living. Without these conditions, these channels would not create personal or group basic liberties. Fourthly, minimalist republicans argue that if the state is effectively forced to pursue individuals’ or group’s basic liberties, then the state would not be dominating. Minimalist republican version of non-domination must be reasonably accepted by everyone. The reasonableness of minimalist republicanism consists in “guarantee of effectiveness”. Unlike political liberals, reasonable persons would give and abide by “effective common reasons”, rather than “public reasons” for social cooperation. Rawls’s position presupposes liberal or social contract tradition. This presupposition would be accused of making arbitrary exclusion against those illiberal points of view. We cannot expect the state would actually guarantee the basic liberties of the citizens by doing so. Although Gaus and D’agostino respectively criticize and construct alternative theories of public justification for liberalism, I think both theories are unsound so that their solution to the problem of public justification is still ineffective. However, minimalist republicans would prefer “effective common reasons” in justifying the laws and republican norms. If every citizen would like to give and obey the effective common reasons, then they would have stronger motivation to support the republican state. Because this type of reasons would not involve any particular interest, traditions, voices and so on, the state can effectively maintain citizens’ basic liberties. The difficulty of public justification would be minimized under minimalist republicanism.