本研究主要目的在於探討法人的持股比例及持股穩定性是否影響其監督功能,進而降低代理問題,提昇公司現金持有價值。本研究延伸Faulkender and Wang (2006)所提出之現金持有價值模型,加入法人持股比例與持股穩定性與現金交乘項進行檢驗。研究結果發現:法人持股比例較高的公司其持有現金價值會高於法人持股比例較低的公司。再者,法人持股穩定性愈高與波動性愈小的公司,持有現金的價值也愈高。本研究進一步將樣本區隔成公司治理強及公司治理差兩組,實證發現法人持股比例與法人持股穩定性在提升現金價值的效果,於公司治理差的公司比公司治理強的公司來的明顯,此一結果證實不僅法人的持股比例與其監督效能有關,持股穩定性也是影響其監督誘因與能力的重要因素。建議後續研究在探討法人之監督影響時,應同時考量法人之持股比例與持股穩定性。 關鍵詞:法人持股比例、法人持股穩定性、公司治理、現金持有價值
We posit that the distribution institutional ownership could affect the value destruction associated with increases in cash holdings. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the market value of an additional dollar in cash holdings increases in the level and the stability of institutional ownership. We find that the monitoring benefit arising from institutional ownership is more pronounced for firms facing higher agency problems. Our analysis suggests that institutional ownership mitigates agency costs related to incentive conflicts between shareholders and managers by inducing a more efficient use of cash holdings by managers, thereby providing direct benefits to shareholders. This evidence is particularly important in light of the tremendous growth in cash holdings in Taiwan in recent years and the massive value losses that can result from cash holdings. Keywords: Institutional ownership; Stability of institutional ownership; Corporate governance; Value of cash holdings.