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  • 學位論文

CEO特質及公司治理對私募案件成功與否影響性之實證研究

An Empirical Study of the Impact of CEO Characteristics and Corporate Governance on the Success of Private Replacement

指導教授 : 黃劭彥
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摘要


CEO為企業的關鍵人物,其獨特的領導特質對企業經營策略具有重大的影響能力;健全的公司治理機制則能合理配置股東及高階管理者之間的責任與權利,並兼顧其他利害關係人的利益。在評估投資案中,CEO人格特質與公司治理機制為專業投資人必要的審查評估項目,然而面對私募企業參差不齊的素質,專業投資人如何從CEO特質與公司治理機制中去審視具投資價值的私募案呢? 故本研究預期CEO特質與公司治理機制對私募案件成功與否具有一定程度之關聯。本研究以任期、教育程度、功能性背景、國際化經驗及持股比率等5項CEO特質與職務雙元性、董事會規模、董監事持股比率、董監事質押比率、大股東持股比率及獨立董監事席次比率等6項公司治理變數為自變數,並納入公司規模、產業虛擬變數、年度虛擬變數、私募用途虛擬變數、當年度私募宣告次數、上市櫃公司種類、每股盈餘、資產報酬率及負債比率等9項控制變數,研究期間為2003~2011年,研究範圍以台灣上市、上櫃公司私募案件為主,樣本量共計1,337個,並以羅吉斯迴歸檢視對私募案件成功與否之影響程度。而後再區分為製造業及服務業等兩組,分別檢視其差異性。 實證結果指出,在所有樣本下,CEO持股比率與董監事持股比率呈現顯著正相關;職務雙元性與董監事質押比率呈現顯著負相關。以製造業而言,僅有CEO持股比率與董監事持股比率呈現顯著正相關;以服務業而言,CEO教育程度、持股比率、董監事持股比率及大股東持股比率均呈現顯著正相關,CEO任期、董監事質押比率及獨立董監事席次比率則呈獻顯著負相關。

並列摘要


CEO is a keyman in the enterprise. His unique leadership qualities have a significant impact on corporation strategy. In addition to CEO’s personal characteristics, the better the corporate governance mechanism has been set up, the more efficient the responsibilities and rights could be allocated between stockholders and top management,especially for stakeholders’ interest. In the assessment of investment proposals, professional investors generally regard CEO’s personal characteristics and corporate governance mechanism as essential indexes for assessment. However, facing the unequal qualities of private replacements, how can the professional investors evaluate their investment value by way of examining CEO’s personal characteristics and corporate governance mechanism? In this study, we collect CEO characteristics and corporate governance mechanism data including tenure, education level, functional background, international experience, stock ownership, duality, the size of board, the ratio of board ownership, the ratio of boards’shares pledged, the ratio of large shareholder ownership and the ratio of independent director and supervisor compositions as independent variables, and also included company size, industry, year, private replacement use, the number of annual private replacement declaration, listed category, earnings per share, return on asset and liability ratio as control variables. The time period of 2003-2011 is selected, and 1,337 private replacement samples in listed companies in taiwan were chosen as objects of study. This study uses a logistic regression model to test the hypotheses. Finally we further divided into the two groups of the manufacturing and service sectors, and examined the defferences. The empirical results on the relationship between CEO characteristics and the success of private replacement in all samples indicate that duality and the ratio of boards’shares pledged have shown a significant negative correlation; CEO stock ownership and the ratio of board ownership has shown significant positive correlation. In the manufacturing sectors, only CEO stock ownership and the ratio of board ownership has shown significant positive correlation. In the service sectors, CEO tenure, the ratio of boards’shares pledged and the ratio of independent director and supervisor compositions have shown a significant negative correlation; CEO’s education level, stock ownership, the ratio of board ownership and the ratio of large shareholder ownership has shown significant positive correlation.

參考文獻


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