反向混淆理論之研究-以美國法為主

陳思伃(Chen, SiYu)

指導教授 ： 陳文吟

國立中正大學/法學院/財經法律學系/碩士(2013年)

摘要

商標法用以表彰商品/服務之來源，並與他人商品作區隔。為達成商標之功能，禁止第三人構成混淆誤認之虞亦成為第三人使用商標的範圍限制。在我國商標申請實務上，多以「混淆誤認之虞審查基準」中之八項因素為綜合考量，但這些判斷因素並未就混淆誤認之類型加以區分。近期實務發展出一值得討論之議題-反向混淆理論(reverse confusion)，意即在先之商標權人於市場上處於弱勢地位，而在後之商標權人處於強勢地位或已達著名程度，此時在後之商標權人可能會讓消費者產生先商標權人所提供之商品/服務係源自後商標權人的錯誤印象。
美國法院對於反向混淆理論之承認，早期於由Westward一案採保守之態度，然從Big O一案後，美國之實務判決漸漸地肯認反向混淆理論之適當性，認定即便反向混淆之案件，消費者所誤認之對象與順向混淆有所不同，為確保商標權保護消費者對於商品/服務來源認知的正確性，承認該理論，並對於大型公司挾其財力，超越先商標權人知名度而造成混淆之侵權行為，加以禁止。美國學說文章對於反向混淆理論之廣泛討論；反觀之，我國實務判決中，美心案曾指出不應鼓勵「後申請人藉由強勢之市場地位或短期大量之行銷，造成消費者反向混淆」之情況，傾向承認反向混淆理論，但到ADIDAS與Jump的訴訟，卻因ADIDAS在市場上的強勢地位，肯認兩商標於國內可並存，對於我國Jump之保護恐有不足，且似乎未將反向混淆理論成立之可能性納入考量。
對於反向混淆理論於我國之適用應有定論，否則恐將使商標權人無所適從，甚至有礙於工商業正常發展。本文認為依據文意解釋及貫徹我國採先註冊主義之立場，反向混淆理論已然包含於本文混淆誤認之虞之類型當中，即便商標法中有部分論及混淆誤認之虞得條文，可能因其它構成要件(例如：商標著名要件)與反向混淆本質上相衝突而無法成立反向混淆，然並非條文本身之文意刻意排除反向混淆之類型。故本文認為於混淆誤認之虞審查基準當中，混淆誤認之類型中加以說明即可。

關鍵字

混淆誤認之虞的判斷因素 ； 商標侵權 ； 反向混淆理論

並列摘要

In order to achieve the function of our country’s Trademark Law, prohibiting the likelihood of confusion caused by the use of third person have become very important. Practically, we often use the eight factors which published by the Intellectual Property Office to consider whether the situation have constitutes “likelihood of confusion”. But in those factors, we do not separate from the types of confusion. Recently, courts have developed the type of reverse confusion, which occurred when the legitimate prior user’s goods or services became likely to be perceived as those of the junior user.
In 1968, U.S. Seventh Circuit, the first Courts of Appeals to address the concept, rejected reverse confusion (Westward case). Then, ten years later, the Tenth Circuit became the first federal circuit court to accept this concept (Big O case). Now, most of the federal circuit courts have accepted the doctrine, based on the belief that “without the recognition of reverse confusion, smaller senior users would have little protection against larger, more powerful companies who want to use identical or confusingly similar trademarks.” Scholars in the U.S., also had a lot of discussion toward the issue.
Contrarily, our judicial opinion did not reach the conclusion to this new issue. In Maxim case, courts pointed out that “we should not encourage the strong, powerful companies utilizing promotion or advertisement to cause the consumer confusion.” Though later in adidas case, courts indicated that adidas is a well-known company that consumers can distinguish two marks according to the strong recognition of large company in the market. Two marks co-exist in the domestic trademark. In this thesis opinion, the protection of JUMP may not be enough, and courts seemed not to take the reverse confusion theory into consideration in this case.
The issue should come to a positive conclusion, or the normal development of industry and commerce may be hindered. Based on the interpretation of context and the implementation of first-to-register doctrine, this thesis concluded that the type of reverse confusion has already been included in our Trademark Law. Reverse confusion may not occur in some of the Trademark Sections because the constituent elements (for example: well-known) is conflict with this theory.

並列關鍵字

reverse confusion

參考文獻

4. 經濟部智慧財產局，《商標法第30條第1項第11款著名商標保護審查基準》，民國101年版。

5. 經濟部智慧財產局，《商標法逐條釋義》，民國102年版。

3. 林發立、孫安婷，最高行政法院近期關於商標法上「反向混淆誤認」(Reverse Confusion) 之看法及其可能影響，萬國法律183期，起訖頁44-57，民國101年6月。

3. 謝青蓉，商標法上混淆誤認之虞之理論與實踐，國立台灣大學法律學研究所碩士論文，民國95年6月。

2. MCCARTHY, J. THOMAS, MCCARTY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (4th ed. 2007).