This dissertation is comprised of two topics related to private equity placement. Attig, Cleary, Ghoul, and Guedhami (2012) argue that long-term institutional investors have an informational advantage that stems from their ability to invest more resources in generating precise information and more efficiently engage in quality research than short-term institutional investors. The first topic provides the evidence that long-term institutional investor has an information advantage to private equity placement firms. The firm invested by long-term institutional investors could deliver the better quality of a firm than by short-term institutional investors, and thereby reduce the agency cost or entrenchment cost and information asymmetry between managers and external investors. Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009) and Chen, Dai, and Schatzberg (2010) consider a private investment in public equity (PIPE) offering the last resort equity financing for firms that are barred from traditional financing tunnels. The second topic provides evidence of managerial motives for raising equity capital by examining the decision to cancel private equity placements. Financial constraint and undervaluation are both the managerial motivations to complete private equity placement. The firms that complete placements have better post-performance benefited from monitoring effect of sophisticated investor. The firms that cancel placements under financial constraints have worst post-performance due to unsolved financial difficulty and the reluctance of sophisticated investor to dedicate capital to issuers.