忙碌董事與資本支出

Busy Boards and Capital Expenditure

許捷(Chieh Hsu)

指導教授 ： 鄭揚耀 ； 顏子瑜

國立中正大學/管理學院/財務金融學系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

這份文獻主要探討台灣2008年至2012年台灣上市公司忙錄董事、忙碌獨立董事對公司資本支出的影響。忙碌董事與忙碌獨立董事，他們具有經驗、人脈，但是由於身兼多職，並不能有效監控公司運作。先前的文獻都是分別對公司資本支出與忙碌董事、忙碌獨立董事分開做研究; 這篇文獻將兩種議題合併討論，結果發現忙碌董事相較於忙碌獨立董事會造成公司過度投資。因此我們建議當公司在一個營運穩定階段時，應加強公司治理，來減少過度投資的傾向。

關鍵字

忙碌董事

並列摘要

Using data from all listed firms in Taiwan from 2008 to 2012, this paper analyzes the effects of busy directors and independent ones on investment. The rise in the concept of the busy director (multi-directorship) has become phenomenal. Busy directors are more experienced and better connected, but are more distracted with ineffective monitoring than independent ones. We depart from previous research by documenting examining the relationship of the new aspects of busy boards, busy independent boards, and investment inefficiency. Our findings indicate that firms with busy boards tend to overinvest. When firms are in a stable stage with stable growth profit, they should enhance corporate governance and reduce the number of busy directors in the board.

並列關鍵字

Busy Boards

參考文獻

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