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  • 學位論文

分析師能否抑制多角化折價的幅度

Analyst Coverage and Diversification Discount

指導教授 : 周庭楷
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摘要


本研究旨在檢驗分析師跟隨能否抑制多角化折價的幅度,使用Berger and Ofek(1995)方式,收集1987年到2012年Compustat Industrial Segment資料庫樣本,共計7,373個公司-年觀察值,檢測分析師與多角化折價的關係,亦使用公司固定效果模型、工具變數法及Heckman自我選擇模型等三種方法來減緩內生性偏誤問題。實證結果顯示,對多角化公司而言,分析師跟隨能抑制多角化折價的幅度,對專營公司而言,亦能提升其公司價值。本研究進一步將分析分為高分析師跟隨與低分析師跟隨兩個不同群組,實證結果顯示,高分析師跟隨群組的公司價值相較於低分析師跟隨群組的公司價值顯著為正,換言之,分析師跟隨數量會降低多角化折價幅度且有顯著差異。

並列摘要


Researchers argue that analysts’ information acquisition efforts increase firm value by facilitating monitoring of firms’ activities and, thereby, reducing agency costs. However, prior research provides limited and inconclusive empirical evidence to support this argument. This article extends the literature by examining the impact of analyst coverage on the valuation of diversification. Our empirical results indicate that the number of analyst following are associated with a lower negative effect of diversification. Our results are robust to alternative techniques used to control for potential endogeneity bias and to different sample periods. These findings are consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, specifically that financial analysts play an important governance role in scrutinizing managerial agency problems, and thus mitigate the diversification discount.

參考文獻


Aggarwal R. and A. Samwick, 2003, Why do managers diversify their firms? Agency reconsidered, The Journal of Finance, 58, 71–118.
Beaver W.H., 2002, Perspectives on Recent Capital Market Research, Accounting Review, 77, 453–474.
Bens D. and S. Monahan, 2004, Disclosure quality and the excess value of diversification. Journal of Accounting Research, 42, 691–730.
Berger P. and E. Ofek, 1995, Diversification's effect on firm value, Journal of Financial Economics, 37, 39–65.
Best R., Hodges C. and Lin B., 2004, Does information asymmetry explain the diversification discount? The Journal of Finance, 27, 235–249.

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