本研究檢驗分析師與公司內部控制缺失的關聯性。在美國沙賓法案404條款頒布之後,會計師需要對公司之內部控制有效性做出評估而成為一個獨立的外部監督機制,藉此探討分析師是否能成為另一個外部監督機制來降低公司被評估有內部控制缺失之情況,也就是分析師跟隨之公司能降低公司發生內部控制缺失之可能,另外分析師的特質(如經驗及受雇於大型證券商)是否也影響著監督的功能。本研究以logistic迴歸模型檢驗分析師報導程度及分析師特質是否與內部控制缺失呈現負相關,實證結果顯示,1)有分析師報導之公司較無分析師報導之公司發生內部控制缺失程度較低,2)分析師跟隨程度較高之公司伴隨內部控制缺失發生的可能較低,以及3)如果分析師的經驗越豐富或是受雇於大型證券商,這些特質能幫助降低內部控制缺失發生。
This study examines the relationship between analyst coverage and internal control problems. The primary issue is whether analyst coverage will mitigate internal control problem under Section 404 of Sarbanes- Oxley Act. We find firms with analyst coverage have less internal control weakness than those without it. Besides, the negative association between analyst coverage and internal control. In other words, the internal control weakness is negative with the extent of analyst coverage for firms being followed. Finally, we introduce analysts’ characteristics to test further and find analysts, having more experience on firms, working more years as analysts, and being hired by large broker, are more likely to enhance the effective internal control. Collectively, analysts have monitor effect on internal control.