資訊揭露對盈餘管理與公司績效之影響

The Effects of Information Disclosure on Earnings Management and Corporate Performance

李勇儀(Li, Yong Yi)

指導教授 ： 胥愛琦 ； 劉亞秋

國立中正大學/管理學院/企業管理學系/博士(2014年)

摘要

為了要提升資訊揭露的透明度，台灣證券交易所與櫃檯買賣中心在2003年開始實施資訊揭露評鑑系統(IDTRS)。本篇研究想要探討是否在實施該系統後可以減少公司盈餘管理的使用和改善公司績效，而且在2005年開始系統評鑑資訊透明度的等級從兩等級增加為五等級，這樣的更動是否對盈餘管理和公司績效會造成影響也是本篇論文想了解的。再來，本篇研究分析了公司資訊透明度的等級與盈餘管理和公司績效的關係，還有等級變動後與是否為自願性揭露的公司對盈餘管理和公司績效的影響。實證結果指出資訊揭露評鑑系統的實施可以有效的抑制盈餘管理和改善公司績效，而且資訊揭露的程度與盈餘管理(公司績效)成顯著反向(正向)關係。研究結果也顯示相對於透明度評等被調降的公司而言，評等被調升的公司傾向使用較少的盈餘管理和有較好的公司績效。然而，並沒有顯著證據支持自願性揭露較多的公司較不會使用盈餘管理和有較好的公司績效。

關鍵字

公司績效 ； 盈餘管理 ； 透明度 ； 資訊揭露

並列摘要

In an attempt to achieve greater transparency and disclosure, the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) and the GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) implemented an information disclosure and transparency rankings system (IDTRS) for all listed companies in Taiwan. This study examines whether the implementation of IDTRS reduces earnings manipulation by firms and improves corporate performance, and whether the manipulation practice changes and corporate performance improves after the ranking scheme was revised in 2005. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of information disclosure rankings on earnings manipulation and corporate performance in different ranking schemes, and investigate the relationship between changes in disclosure rankings and both changes in earnings management and corporate performance. The empirical results indicate that accruals-based earnings management and real activities manipulation (corporate performance) can be effectively reduced (improved) by the ranking system, and that the level of information disclosure in different ranking schemes is negatively (positively) related to earnings management (corporate performance). Comparing firms with a transparency ranking downgrade, we show that firms with a ranking upgrade tend to exhibit a significant decrease (increase) in their earnings management activities (corporate performance). However, the empirical evidence indicates that there is no significant evidence for concluding that firms in the “more voluntary disclosure” group are more likely to use less earnings management and have better corporate performance than those not in this group.

並列關鍵字

Earnings Management ； Transparency ； Information Disclosure ； Corporate Performance

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