虧損公司董監事自肥與公司治理之關聯性研究

A Research of the Relationship between Self-Interested Board of Directors and Corporate Governance

林盈秀(YING-HSIU LIN)

指導教授 ： 黃劭彥

國立中正大學/管理學院/會計與資訊科技學系/碩士(2015年)

摘要

在我國法令規範下，當公司報導年度虧損時，就須揭露董監事的薪酬，董監事酬金若有增加之情況還會被公布於公開資訊觀測站上，並引起投資人注意和輿論譴責。在此情況下，良好的公司治理制度理是否幫助公司避免董監事自肥以挽回企業形象。本研究透過董監事自肥公司的揭露，檢測被公告有董監事自肥公司，其公司治理機制是否健全。本研究的實證結果發現，較高的管理者持股比例，公司反而較不容易發生董監事自肥的現象。另外，本研究發現董事兼任經理人容易造成公司董監事自肥。本研究亦發現因為台灣特殊之家族核心代理問題，導致較高的女性董事比例較高的公司容易發生董監事自肥。

關鍵字

公司治理機制 ； 董監事自肥

並列摘要

Under Taiwan legal regulations, when companies report loss for the year, company must disclose the compensation of Board of directors and supervisors. When the compensation of Board of directors and supervisors increased, the company will be listed on the Market Observation Posting System (MOPS) and cause investors and the media attention with this information. In this case, whether the directors and supervisors in loss companies will adopt self-interested to restore corporate image with the good corporate governance mechanisms? So this study tries to examine whether self-interested board of directors in loss companies have the good corporate governance mechanisms. The empirical results show that the higher management ownership, the less self-interested board of directors in loss companies. Moreover, we find losses companies with self-interested board of directors prefer to have the higher CEO Duality. In addition, we also find the higher female directors on board, the higher losses companies with self-interested board of directors result from Core Agency Problem of Family-Control Firm in Taiwan.

並列關鍵字

Corporate Governance Mechanisms ； Self-interested Board of Directors

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