我國現行法規,要求符合條件之公司須揭露審計公費,屬於強制揭露;其他未符合條件之公司應選擇揭露公費的金額或級距,是為自願揭露;而亦有公司選擇不揭露,形成我國獨特的門檻式審計公費揭露制度。本研究主要探討此揭露制度與審計品質之間的關聯性,也探討在不同揭露條件下,審計公費與審計品質的關係。 本研究以台灣上市櫃公司在2009至2013年間,共6,594筆觀察值為樣本。採用多元迴歸分析進行實證,結果發現審計公費與審計品質有正向之關係,而自願揭露者也會有較佳之審計品質,但揭露金額者與審計品質並沒有關係。此外,在自願揭露與強制揭露下,審計公費與審計品質皆是顯著正相關。代表在這兩種不同揭露條件下,公費與品質間的關係是沒有顯著差異。但比較揭露公費是金額或級距的資訊時,兩者在審計公費與審計品質間的關係則具有差異性。
New policy requires that company should disclose its information of audit fee, if the company tallies with the condition. And this is a mandatory disclosure. Other companies can choose disclose the amount or the range of audit fee. And this is a voluntary disclosure. Also, few companies do not disclose the audit fee. The policy is a unique setting in Taiwan. This paper examines the relationship between the disclosure of audit fee and audit quality, and examines the relationship between audit fee and audit quality, under different situations. Based on 6,594 observations in the Taiwan stock exchanges from 2009 to 2013, we find that the relationship between audit fee and audit quality is positive. Also, the relationship between voluntary disclosure and audit quality is positive. But, the disclosure of fee amount is not related to audit quality. Moreover, the relationship between audit fee and audit quality is positive while the companies choose voluntary disclosure. But, the audit fee is not related to audit quality with mandatory disclosure.