本論文的主要目的,是考察某些當代模態性質研究所遭遇的難題,分析這些難題的根源,並提出解決方案。一般認為,模態性質研究的核心目標是:針對某物所具有的特定模態性質,提出該性質的個體化原則 (individuation principle),並說明這個原則不會有反例。但是,要能夠說明模態性質個體化原則沒有反例,必須先將這個模態性質歸屬給特定物體,而這就需要提出一個合理的、非任意的模態性質歸屬原則 (attribution principle)。 在這篇論文中,筆者論證,由於模態性質的非現實 (non-actual) 面向特徵,當我們從純粹形上學的面向來考量模態性質時,我們就必須考慮與這個模態性質所有相關的非現實情境,而這就使得模態性質的歸屬很難確定,從而造成模態性質個體化原則易於遭受反例挑戰,導致相關的模態性質研究不令人滿意。筆者將以傾向、可靠度以及先驗性這三個模態性質為例,進一步論證,當我們能夠將關注轉換到模態性質的知識論面向,並在這個面向下去考慮模態性質的非現實特徵,我們就可以有更多的資源提出非任意的模態性質歸屬原則,並依此建立恰當的模態性質個體化原則。
The main objectives of this dissertation are to investigate, analyze and find solution to the difficulties of the contemporary study of some modal properties. Normally the core of the aforementioned study is: to provide the individuation principle of a given modal property and further justify this principle by showing that no counterexample of it can be found. However, in order to show that a given individuation principle as such has no counterexample, one has to first find an attribution principle, which is required to be not just non-arbitrary but also reasonable, to attribute the modal property to certain objects. Due to the non-actual feature of modal properties, the problem of finding a suitable attribution principle for a given modal property, I argue, is that, when we consider this property from the purely metaphysical aspect, we have to consider all non-actual situations “relevant” to this property. The current study of modal properties is unsatisfactory partially because the way to find any attribution principle of a respective modal property inevitably leads the individuation principle of this property to some counterexamples. In terms of the three examples of disposition, reliability and apriority, I argue that to consider the non-actual feature of modal properties by virtue of not just the metaphysical aspect but also the epistemic aspect, we actually have more resources to give non-arbitrary attribution principles for respective modal properties by which suitable individuation principles can be thereby elicited accordingly.