摘要
高階思想理論（Higher-order Thought theory, HOT）從接受無意識心理狀態存在的立場出發，透過以及物原則為基礎所發展出的高階思想假設以及現象原則來說明心理狀態的有意識以及現象特徵。對HOT而言，意識與現象特徵都是實例化在高階思想與一階心理狀態所構成的高階表徵關係上。Kriegel以一階心理狀態不存在的錯誤表徵為基礎，對HOT提出了無對象問題（targetless problem）的反駁，主張及物原則與現象原則蘊含著一組矛盾的結論。面對此一反駁，Brown以放棄及物原則的方式來消除矛盾，提出意識是高階思想的內在性質此一主張。在另一方面，Weisberg則透過對及物原則再詮釋的方式來處理上述反駁，主張將及物原則中的知曉關係視為一意向關係，以純粹意向對象來建立錯誤表徵中的高階表徵關係。在本文中，我將指出上述兩種回應方式所分別遭遇的問題，並提出另外一套不僅能解決無對象問題也能克服前述兩種回應方式所面臨的困境的可能方法：以內容模式的意向關係架構來理解及物原則，將高階表徵關係建立在高階思想與其內容上。本文旨在說明高階思想理論所面臨的無對象問題，並討論此一問題能否被成功地克服。
並列摘要
Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory proposes the higher-order hypothesis and the phenomenal principle to explain both phenomena of consciousness and phenomenal character. According to this HOT theory, both consciousness and phenomenal character can be explained by the representational relation constituted of a higher-order thought and a first-order mental state. Recently, this HOT theory is facing a strong objection based on the targetless problem. The problem is: it is possible for a higher-order thought to represent a certain first-order mental state which doesn’t even exist. Given the targetless case, Kriegel claims we can derive a contradiction if we accept both transitivity principle and phenomenal principle. In order to defend the HOT theory, Brown and Weisberg have each proposed their own solutions. Brown has chosen to give up the transitivity principle and claims phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic property of higher-order thought. Weisberg tries to avoid the contradiction by reinterpreting the context of “aware of” in the transitivity principle as intentional rather than factual. This way, the higher- order representational relation can be preserved in the targetless case, even if the target of a higher-order thought is a merely intentional object. In this paper, I will argue that both Brown's and Weisberg's approaches fail and then I will propose a better solution for the targetless problem. We should understand what is mentioned in the transitivity principle as a relation between a HOT and its content, rather than the intentional object. If my proposal is acceptable, Rosenthal’s HOT theory can survive the targetless objection.
參考文獻
延伸閱讀
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