植基於供給量及其價格的多單位拍賣問題機制設計

Multi-unit Auctions Based on Bidder's Demanding Amounts

廖軒磒(HSUAN-YUAN LIAO)

指導教授 ： 李新林

國立中正大學/工學院/資訊工程學系/碩士(2016年)

摘要

我們知道在傳統的多單位拍賣論文中多半是在討論拍賣者有多少個貨品要賣給投標人. 在本篇論文中,我們反向探討買家有多少個貨品要從賣家那收購, 每一個賣家都有一個private value,代表每一個貨品最低要賣多少錢和unit limit,代表最多有多少個貨品可以賣. 我們提出一個機制收購所有的貨品,這個機制分成兩個部分實作,分別是:decision rule跟pricing rule. Decision rule部分是根據賣家的 private value跟unit limit來決定哪些賣家可以優先被收購貨品, pricing rule部分是決定要向那些賣家收購多少個貨品和用多少錢來收購每一個貨品. 在我們的設計機制當中,會滿足兩個公平性質:Truthfulness and Near Pareto optimality. 我們實驗評估的部分, 我們的演算法會跟Greedy algorithm做比較, 證明為何我們所設計的演算法可以有效的防止賣家說謊他們本身的private value跟unit limit從中獲得利益.

關鍵字

拍賣

並列摘要

We know many of the multi-unit auctions theses are discussions about how many items auctioneers are selling to bidders. In this thesis, we are reversing the facade into how many items are going to be bought from different sellers, each seller has a private value for each units minimum price and a unit limit on sale in the auction. We propose a mechanism for buying all the units and it is two rules are applied, they are decision rule is based on sellers' unit and value to decide whether a seller will be assigned any units and pricing rule is based on sellers' unit to decide the price for buying from each participants unit which they sale. In our designed mechanism, two properties of fairness, Truthfulness and Near Pareto optimality are satisfied. And our algorithm is compared with Greedy algorithm. In our experimental evaluations, our algorithm can prevent seller from lying his value and units for making profit.
Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions, Truthfulness, Near Pareto Optimality

並列關鍵字

auction

參考文獻

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