台灣實證研究公司治理對經營績效的影響

The Influence of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan

歐米玲(MI-LING OU)

指導教授 ： 余曉靜

國立中正大學/管理學院/財務金融學系/碩士(2016年)

摘要

公司的績效和價值會因為指派獨立董事而改善嗎? 公司治理會如何影響公司的績效? 本篇研究將使用台灣的資料來探討這兩個問題. 實證研究顯示,本研究的結果和過去的文獻相反,獨立董事對於公司績效是顯著正向的.研究還發現,公司績效和機構擁有者呈現正相關.最後研究顯示,董事會大小和公司績效呈現負相關.

關鍵字

公司治理

並列摘要

Can corporate performance and value of the company be improved by appointment of
outside directors? How corporate governance and ownership make influence to firm
performance? The answer to these questions may vary from company to company or country to
country. However, in this research we will try to answer for that question for Taiwanese
companies. We consider of corporate governance for listed companies in Taiwan Stock
Exchange and Taipei Exchange (Gre Tai Securities Market) during the period 2000- 2015. Given
the passage of Independent Directors System during 2006, we will study how corporate
governance performance might have been impacted by this regulation.
Our empirical results show that, in contrast to studies in U.S and U.K firms the effects of
independent directors on firm performance is positive. Board independents has a significant and
positive effect on firm performance in our study on Taiwanese firms. We also find that firm
performance is positively related to institutional ownership. Additionally, we observe that the
separation between chairman and CEO associated with firm performance. In contrast, our
evidence points out that board size are negatively associated with firm performance.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance

參考文獻

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