本文主要是探討在可轉換公司債資產交換市場開放後,Lewis, Rogalski , and Steward(1999)所提出的兩個主要發行可轉換公司債動機,即討論代理問題和資訊不對稱問題,是否會受到管理階層欲獲取個人利益之意圖影響。研究樣本為2004至2014年間發行可轉換公司債的上市櫃公司,最終樣本為990筆觀察值,並以多元迴歸檢測相關假說。 研究結果發現,在代理問題方面,當轉換溢價率越低、股價波動率大,及轉換時間較短時,表示管理階層可能有在資產交換市場中獲取個人利益之意圖,因此存在之代理問題將更加嚴重。在資訊不對稱問題層面,當股價波動的程度越大,代表管理階層可能有意圖於資產交換市場中獲取個人利益,則公司與投資人間存在之資訊不對稱問題將越大。
The purpose of this study is to discuss whether the two main reasons for issuing convertible bond proposed by Lewis, Rogalski, and Steward (1999). In other words, it’s to investigate whether the agency problems and information asymmetry would be influenced by the management who want to obtain personal interest. The sample period is from 2004 to 2014 including listing companies issued convertible bonds in Taiwan. The final observations are 990, to test related hypotheses by multiple regressions. The empirical results found that, in terms of the agency problem, when the lower the conversion premium rate is, the greater stock price volatility is, and the shorter conversion time is, the management may have the intention of obtaining personal interest in the assets SWAP market. Therefore, agency problem between company and investors is more severe. About information asymmetry problems, the volatility degree of stock price is positive with information asymmetry, representing that management may have the intention for personal interest in the asset SWAP market. Hence, information asymmetry problems between company and investors would be worse.