股東行動主義對公司績效之影響

Shareholder Activism and Corporate Performance

廖怡惠(Yi-Huei Liau)

指導教授 ： 許文西

國立屏東科技大學/管理學院/企業管理系所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6346/NPUST.2009.00129

摘要

我國自從一九九七年亞洲金融風暴及一九八八年以後持續發生地雷股事件後，有越來越多的投資人意識到，若採取與之前相同的消極態度，將會使自己的權利消失於沉默之中。因此股東意識之覺醒已成為必然之趨勢，如此股東便可充分發揮監督之職能，對企業產生一定的約束效果。
因此本研究欲透過年度股東大會出席股份率以探討股東行動主義對公司績效之影響，進而透過機構投資者持股比例、家族未上市法人董事席次比率及家族未上市法人監察人席次比率以探討各類型股東中影響力最大之機構投資者行動主義是否會對公司績效產生影響，研究樣本包含二○○七年至二○○八年上市公司，共計1288個樣本。
本研究以台灣股票上市公司為研究對象，實證探討股東行動主義與公司績效間之關聯性。實證結果發現：（1）探討股東行動主義與公司績效之關係方面，年度股東大會出席股份率與公司績效呈顯著之正相關，因此研判當股東若越積極的參與股東會，表達自己對公司營運的看法並提出具體的建議，將會對公司之管理階層形成一定之壓力，驅使管理階層做出有利於全體股東之決策；（2）在探討機構股東行動主義與公司績效之關係方面，除了「家族未上市法人監察人席次比率」外，其他自變項皆呈現顯著關係。其中，「機構投資者持股比例」與「家族未上市法人董事席次比率」皆與本研究之預期方向相符且達顯著水準，研判集結所有小股東力量之機構投資者由於其利益與利害關係人的長期利益息息相關，因此在股東行動主義的影響和作用下，同樣會成為監督公司管理階層的環節之一，促使對公司績效產生正面之影響效果。本研究之結果顯示股東行動主義的確可以改善公司績效，惟法人擔任監察人之角色時較難發揮原本應有之監督效用。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 股東行動主義 ； 機構投資者 ； 機構投資者行動主義

並列摘要

Since 1997 Asian financial crisis and there are many company become financial-distress company later, there are many investors aware that if taking the same passive attitude at before, their rights might be gradually disappeared in their silence. Therefore, waking the shareholders up to exercise their rights has become the inevitable trend. Therefore, shareholders can supervise company and put certain restraints.
According, this research uses annual general meeting of shareholders attendance share rate to probe into relationships between shareholder activism and corporate performance. The variables of the percentage of institutional investors, the percentage of institutional investors being directors of the board from family unlisted companies and the percentage of institutional investors being supervisors of the board from the family’s unlisted companies, are used to probe into the relationship between institutional investors activism and corporate performance. The sample includes 1288 listed companies for the period of 2007 to 2008.
This research investigates the relationship between shareholder activism and corporate governance using a sample of 644 listed companies for 2007 and 2008. The empirical findings are as follows:
(1) For the relationships between shareholder activism and corporate performance aspect, annual general meeting of shareholders attendance share rate has a significantly positive relationship with corporate performance, indicating that when shareholders actively attend to general meeting, expressing their perspectives about operating the company and bring up specific suggestions, will impose certain degree of pressure on the management of the company. Therefore, it may force the management to make the decision which is favorable to all shareholders; (2) For the relationship between institutional investors activism and corporate performance, except for the variable of the percentage of institutional investors being supervisors of the board from the family’s unlisted companies, other independent variable are significant. The variables of institutional investor shareholding and the percentage of institutional investors being directors of the board from family unlisted companies are conform to this research’s expected direction and achieve level of significance, indicating that the interests of institutional investors are related to long-term interests of the stakeholders. Therefore, under the influence and function of shareholder activism, the involvement of institutional investors in companies may become one of the forces in supervising company's management, that may have positive influence on company's performance. The result of this research means shareholder activism actually can improve corporate performance.

並列關鍵字

Corporate Governance ； Shareholder Activism ； Institutional Investment ； Institutional Investment Activism

參考文獻

吳欽杉、辛沛翰、歐思珊（2007）。機構投資人在IPOs持股因素與績效預測之研究。數據分析，第2卷，第6期，113-34。

陳紫雲（2007）。美國股東行動主義之抬頭與蛻變中之董事會。會計研究月刊，第259期，86-96。

王育慧（2008）。從公司治理論機構投資人股東權之行使-以公共基金為中心。國立政治大學法律學研究所博士論文。

蔡瀞萱（2007）。兩岸公司治理與財務危機關聯性之研究。國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。

Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C. R. （1996）. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders. Journal of Firm and Quantitative Analysis, 31（3）, 377-397.