企業併購策略之研究－訊息不對稱持續協議模型之應用

企業之所以採用併購的方式來達成其外部成長的目的，乃希望藉由兩家公司合併後所創造的整體價值，能夠大於個別公司價值總額，而得到綜效(Synergy)。併購的成功與否其中相當重要的因素為參與併構協議的雙方對於併購價格的認知是否相同。然而現實市場中往往存在著訊息不對稱(Asymmetric Information)的現象，造成併購過程評價的誤差並影響併購協議的結果。本文以兩期持續協議賽局模型及三期持續協議賽局模型分析當目標公司擁有私有訊息時如何影響參與併購案件雙方的決策過程，得到以下結果： 1. 主併公司具有耐性時，較有壓低均衡價格的空間；當主併公司擁有較低的折現因子時，則會主動提高本期價格以誘使目標公司接受。 2. 當目標公司具有耐性時，則容易迫使主併公司提高均衡價格；當目標公司不具有耐性時，則主併公司傾向下修均衡價格。 3. 當此併購方案評價較高時，主併公司容易提高均衡價格；當此併購方案評價較低時，主併公司則會降低均衡價格。

關鍵字

持續協議；完全貝氏均衡；併購

並列摘要

The most important goal of companies is to achieve the maximum value of companies and stockholders. Managers seek for synergy, 1+1>2, by merger and acquisitions to improve competitiveness. It is the hard part to decide the adequate price by buyer and seller. The price is too low to enthuse the seller. In the other hand, the price is too high to corrode the buyer’s synergy. It is resulting from asymmetric information and misvaluing the project of M&A. The author use the sequential bargaining model to introduce the procedure of decision making and pricing base on their own information set. Finally, I find out buyer’s and seller’s best strategies and solutions in this M&A game.

並列關鍵字

Sequential Bargaining ； Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ； M&A

參考文獻

Akerlof, G. (1970) “The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 84, 488-500.

Berkovitch, E. and Khanna, N. (1991). “A theory of Acquisition Markets: Mergers versus Tender Offers, and Golden Parachutes,” The Review of Financial Studies. 4(1), 149-174.

Cramton, P. (1984). “Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies. 51(4), 579-593.

Cramton, P. (1992). “Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-sided Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies. 59, 205-225.

Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1983). “Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information,” Review of Economic Studies. 50, 221-247.

國際替代計量

企業併購策略之研究－訊息不對稱持續協議模型之應用

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