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  • 學位論文

酒駕行為、代駕品質與政府取締之關聯性研究:賽局理論之應用

An Application of Game Theory on the Relationship between the Drunk Driver, Driving Service and Government Policy

指導教授 : 張宮熊

摘要


本研究以賽局理論的方式,討論酒駕民眾、代理駕駛經營者和政府三方之間的互動關係,探討之間存在納許均衡。政府加強取締跟地區巡邏或是加入經營者供給完善的代理駕駛的服務,是否能夠減少酒駕事件的發生可能性?長久以來是全民關注的重點和政府重大施政決定策略。 本研究以賽局模型之納許均衡解來分析瞭解政府取締嚴格和寬鬆和代理駕駛服務品質是否影響人民酒駕的決定策略,利用賽局的納許均衡分析,探討三位參賽者所對應不同策略組合下的報酬。政府為了徹底解決酒駕事件,因此加強了取締酒駕的實施力及宣導酒駕的嚴重性,及請經營者參與配合供給良好之代理駕駛服務品質來降低酒駕發生。而政府取締嚴格和寬鬆和代理駕駛服務品質之好壞應能影響人民酒駕的決定策略。依賽局模型納許均衡分析,若要降低民眾酒駕之發生率,關鍵因素在於提高民眾酒駕所付出之成本,如增加民眾因酒駕而取締所帶來的違規損害,及酒駕被取締的機率,民眾應會因違規損害的增加而減少駕的機率,政府也能夠給予代理駕駛經營者更多的補助來提高代理駕駛經營者的報酬及提高代理駕駛服務品質水準,讓經營者供給更多的服務及讓民眾增加使用代理駕駛服務的意願而減少酒駕的機率。因此,正確的使用賽局理論,能夠幫助政府擬定各種策略模式,減少人民酒駕的行為。

並列摘要


This research discusses the interaction between the drunk driving people, the driving service industry and the government in the way of game theory, and discusses the existence of a Nash Equilibrium between them. Can the government step up patrols in the area or join the industry to provide comprehensive agency driving services. Can it reduce the possibility of drunk driving? It has long been the focus of the whole people's attention and the government's major policy decisions. This study uses the Nash equilibrium of the game model to analyze whether the strict and lenient government law enforcement and the quality of agent driving service affect the people’s decision-making for drunk driving. Using the Nash equilibrium analysis of the game theory, the different strategy combinations corresponding to the three contestants are explored. Under the remuneration. In order to completely solve the drunk driving incident, the government has therefore strengthened the enforcement of the ban on drunk driving and publicized the seriousness of drunk driving, and invited the industry to participate and cooperate in providing good quality substitute driving services to reduce the occurrence of drunk driving. The strictness and lenient law enforcement of the government and the quality of the driving service should be able to influence the people's decision to drive after drinking. According to the standard game model, to reduce the incidence of drinking and driving, the main key factor is to increase the cost of drinking and driving, such as increasing the illegal loss caused by the prohibition of drinking and driving, and drinking and driving. The probability of being banned, the public should reduce the risk of drunk driving due to the increase in illegal losses, and the government can also give more subsidies to the driver to increase the remuneration of the driver and improve the quality of the driver’s service. The industry provides more services and allows the public to increase the willingness to use driving services and reduce the chance of drunk driving. Therefore, the correct use of game theory can help the government to formulate various strategic models to reduce people's behaviors of drunk driving.

參考文獻


中文部份
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