本研究主要探討股權結構對代理成本的影響,並以台灣電子工業上市公司為研究對象,運用迴歸分析的方式以股權集中度和股權制衡度,對第一、第二和第三類代理成本進行實證研究,進一步探討公司應採取何種經營方式,能夠有效降低代理成本的發生。從實證分析結果可知,股權集中度越高可以降低第一類代理成本的發生,而對於第二和第三類代理成本並無顯著影響。股權制衡度越高可以降低第一類代理成本的發生,增加第二類代理成本,對第三類代理成本並無顯著影響。另公司規模越大能夠有效降低第一和第二類代理成本,並增加第三類代理成本。對於規模較大的公司而言,外部股東的進入將衝擊原生的管理體制,找到適當的股權結構不僅可以遏止不肖分子侵害公司權益,更有助於提升公司經營成長的可能性。
This paper mainly discusses the relationship between ownership structure and agency cost, taking the Taiwan's electronics listed companies as the research objects, Using regression analysis to conduct empirical research for the first, second and third types of agency costs based on the ownership concentration and the check-and-balance ownership structure, and further explore what operating methods the company adopted can effectively reduce the agency costs. From the results of empirical analysis, it can be seen that the higher the concentration of ownership can reduce the occurrence of the first type of agency costs, but it has no significant impact on the second and third types of agency costs. The higher the check-and-balance ownership structure can reduce the occurrence of the first type of agency costs, increase the second type of agency costs, and have no significant impact on the third type of agency costs. In addition, larger companies can effectively reduce the costs of the first and second types of agency and increase the costs of the third type of agency. For larger companies, the entry of outside shareholders will impact the original management system. Finding an appropriate ownership structure can not only prevent unscrupulous elements from infringing on the company's rights and interests, but also help enhance the possibility of company growth.