本研究以2008年到2013年的台灣半導體上市櫃公司為研究對象,並探討公司投保董監事暨重要職員責任險(簡稱D&O責任險)及多角化程度對企業創新能力之影響。依據過去相關文獻,本研究採用Heckman(1979)的二階段迴歸模型以控制樣本觀察值可能產生的自我選擇偏誤的影響以探討D&O責任險對企業創新能力是否具有公司治理的監督角色。在第一階段中,本研究先利用Probit模型來估計機率函數,以得到選擇性偏誤的調整項,即 Inverse Mill’s Ratio (Mills 反比例);在第二階段中,本研究再將此Mills反比例變數納入第二階段迴歸模型中進行實證研究與分析並探討D&O責任險及多角化程度對企業創新能力之影響性。實證結果發現,相較於未投保D&O責任險的公司,投保D&O責任險的公司具有較高的創新能力。其次,投保D&O責任險金額愈高的公司也具有較高的創新能力。最後,本研究之實證結果也發現企業多角化程度與創新能力之間具有顯著的正相關。總之,本研究之實證結果支持D&O責任險在台灣半導體上市櫃公司所扮演的公司治理機制的角色。
This paper investigates the relationship between Directors’ and Officers’ (hereafter D&O) liability insurance, diversification and corporate innovation capability for Taiwanese publicly-traded semiconductor firms for the period from 2008 to 2013. Based on prior literature, this study employs the two-stage estimation approach in Heckman (1979) and empirically tests the managerial moral hazard opportunism argument of D&O insurance coverage by investigating the association between D&O liability insurance, diversification and corporate innovation capability. The empirical evidence shows that firms with D&O liability insurance have a higher innovation capability. In addition, there is a significantly positive association between the degree of diversification and corporate innovation capability for firms with D&O liability insurance. Overall, the empirical results support the notion of managerial moral hazard opportunism argument of D&O liability insurance.