本文以2014年至2019年臺灣上市上櫃公司為樣本,探討經理人權力、獨立董事專業背景與盈餘管理之關聯性。實證結果發現,經理人權力越大時,公司盈餘管理程度越低,且當獨立董事具專業背景時,更具有監督之效果,進而強化經理人權力與公司之盈餘管理程度之負向關聯性。這個結果顯示,當經理人具備較高之能力及權力時,可以利用自身之專業能力以及權力做出較佳之經營決策,減少盈餘管理動機,進而降低盈餘管理程度;而獨立董事的專業背景會強化經理人權力與盈餘管理之間的負向關聯性,這代表了獨立董事如立法目的所預期,具有加強公司監督之職能,可以提高公司治理的能力。本文之實證結果將提供公司之利害關係人做經濟決策及制定相關法規時之參考依據。
This study is to investigate the associations among CEO power, the background of independent director and earnings management for firms publicly listed in Taiwan from 2014 to 2019. The empirical results show that there is a negative relationship between CEO power and earnings management, implying that firms with more CEO power have better firm performance and then CEOs have less incentive to manage earnings. Moreover, the results show that the professional background of independent directors would enforce the negative relationship between CEO power and earnings management, supporting the independent directors’ motivation effect on corporate governance.