承保經驗對車體險保單的利潤分析-約定駕駛人附約的干擾效果

Analysis of Underwriting Experience on Profit of Insurance Policy for Auto Body: Interference effect of agreed supplementary articles for drivers

徐佩琪(Pei-Chi Hsu)

指導教授 ： 劉俊廷

國立臺中科技大學/商學院/保險金融管理系/碩士(2021年)

摘要

本文探究台灣汽車保險市場在資訊分享制度下，保險公司承保續期業務是否相較於同業擁有優勢資訊？研究結果發現，保險公司對於承保續期業務與轉保業務的利潤並無顯著差異，顯示目前的資訊分享制度能提供保險公司充足資訊。另外，本文發現承保經驗與約定駕駛人附約對保險公司的獲利性有正向影響，然而約定駕駛人附約於承保經驗對獲利性的正向影響並未產生干擾效果。再者，在風險分類最不完全的30-59歲女性樣本群體中，承保約定駕駛人附約所帶來的獲利性並沒有高於全部樣本。

關鍵字

資訊分享制度 ； 承保經驗 ； 約定駕駛人附約

並列摘要

This study aims to explore whether the insurance company has advantageous information in underwriting renewal business in the information sharing system of the auto insurance market in Taiwan. Results show no significant difference in the profit of insurance companies between underwriting renewal and reinsurance businesses, indicating that the existing information sharing system can provide sufficient information. In addition, the underwriting experience and the agreed supplementary articles for drivers have a positive influence on the profitability of insurance companies. However, this positive influence has no interference effect. Moreover, among the female sample group aged 30–59 with the most incomplete risk classification, profitability from the agreed supplementary articles for drivers is not higher than that of all other samples.

並列關鍵字

information sharing system ； underwriting experience ； agreed supplementary articles for drivers

參考文獻

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