以往關於董事會特性的文獻,大多探討董事會單一特性對應計項目盈餘管理之關聯,而未能考慮董事會成員品質與股權結構的完整面貌,又因為過去研究發現規模大或具產業專家的會計師事務所較會限制受查公司的應計數盈餘管理,而對公司的實質盈餘管理操做則無嚴格的審查,因此,公司內部治理成為抑制實質盈餘管理的重要機制。本研究參考DeFond et al. (2005)之研究,將董事會的七項特性結合為一個綜合指標,並參考Chi et al. (2011)的方法,將三項實質盈餘管理變項結合為一個綜合指標,探討董事會成員特性、股權結構對實質盈餘管理之影響。實證結果發現:董事會品質愈高,愈能抑制公司的實質盈餘管理程度。當內部人持股比率越高,公司的實質盈餘管理程度愈高。然而,機構投資人持股比率越高,愈能減緩公司從是實質盈餘管理活動。本研究結果支持董事會成員品質愈佳,機構投資人持股比率愈高,愈能抑制公司從事實質盈餘管理行為。
Prior studies on the characteristics of a board of directors have primarily focused on how a single trait is correlated to accrual earnings management, while neglecting to consider comprehensively the effects of board member quality and ownership structure. Researchers have found that large accounting firms or those employing industry experts tend to tightly regulate the accrual earning management of audited companies, whereas management of real earnings is more loosely inspected. Therefore, a company’s internal administration is an important instrument in restricting the manipulation of real earnings. To investigate the impact of board member quality and ownership structure on real earnings management, this study integrates the seven conventional characteristics of boards into a single indicator based on research by DeFond et al.(2005), and likewise combines three real earnings management variables into a second indicator based on methods adopted by Chi et al. (2011). Empirical results reveal that higher board member quality results in greater suppression of real earnings management in a corporation. Additionally, while real earnings management intensifies as the percentage of stocks held by a company’s internal investors rise, increased share holdings by institutional investors cause this manipulation to decrease. The results of this study supports the hypothesis that the higher a company’s board member quality and the more its shares are owned by institutional investors, the greater its ability to prevent real earnings management.