本研究以Heckman (1979)的兩階段迴歸法(two-stage method)探討董監事責任險(Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance; 以下簡稱D&O責任險)、家族企業與實質盈餘管理之關聯性。本研究之研究對象與研究期間為2008年至2014年台灣上市上櫃公司。實證結果顯示,相較於未投保D&O責任險之公司,已投保D&O責任險之公司其實質盈餘管理之幅度較大,且當投保的保險金額越高,實質盈餘管理之幅度也越大。此實證結果顯示,購買D&O責任險會導致公司管理階層投機行為及道德風險之產生,因此符合管理階層的機會主義假說。此外,相較於非家族企業,已投保D&O責任險之家族企業,其實質盈餘管理之幅度較大;且其投保金額越大,實質盈餘管理之幅度也越大。此實證結果意涵著,投保D&O責任險之家族企業對實質盈餘管理之影響性存在著利益侵略效果大於結合效果的現象。
Using two-stage method of Heckman (1979), this study examines the relationships between Directors’ and Officers’ (hereafter D&O) liability insurance, family firm, and real earnings management for firms listed in Taiwan for the period from 2008 to 2014. The empirical evidence shows that purchasers are more likely to engage in real earnings management than non-purchasers. The results also demonstrate that purchasers with more D&O liability insurance coverage are more likely to devote to higher degree of real earnings management than non-purchasers, indicating that D&O insurance purchasing leads to a managerial opportunistic moral hazard behavior and the findings are consistent with the managerial opportunism hypothesis. Further, family firms with D&O liability insurance are more likely to devote to real earnings management activities than non-family firms and the higher levels of D&O insurance coverage, the higher degrees of real earnings management. The empirical evidence implies that the interest entrenched family firms’ effects dominate the firms’ alignment effects for the impacts of D&O liability insurance on real earnings management.