根據諮詢機構麥肯錫全球研究院 (McKinsey Global Institute) 的調查顯示中國自2007年以來負債增加了將近4倍,從原本的7.4兆美元增加為28.2兆美元。數據上顯示中國銀行的貸款及備抵呆帳的確與日俱增,在短短的幾年內,中國政府及其地方政府為求快速發展,將大量的資金投入房地產和舉債投資。根據IMF的報告,截至2014年3月為止,影子銀行的社會融資已經上升到GDP的35%,甚至擴大到銀行信貸增長率的兩倍,委託貸款和信託貸款是來自於高度監管的銀行體系之外,佔據了影子銀行社會融資的很大一部分,這樣的結果導致中國出現“流動性不足”的現象。中國政府也體認到問題的嚴重性,引進巴賽爾銀行監理委員會(BCBS)所發布的巴塞爾資本協定III (Basel III) 資本監管協定,且加強其資本監管的約束條件並正式實施中國版Basel III以求提高資金的流動性以防金融危機的發生。 相對於過去探討放款風險承擔的研究,通常是以美國或歐洲為例,中國反而未受到相等的重視。因此,本文的貢獻有以下三點:第1,以中國220家銀行為樣本期間為2000年至2013年,探討中國銀行業放款行為的風險承擔。第2,考慮影子銀行是否會改變銀行放款與風險承擔的關係。第3,是考慮2006年開放外資銀行人民幣業務的影響性。
According survey result from the advisory agency of McKinsey Global Institute. China’s liabilities increase nearly 4 times since 2007, from original 7.4 trillion to 28.2 trillion dollars. Over past few years, rapid developments are pursued by the Chinese central and local governments, causing massive capital flow into real estate market and high level of debt financing. According to IMF report, as of March 2014, shadow banking social financing had risen to 35 percent of GDP and is expanding at twice the rate of bank credit. Entrusted loans and trust loans, originated outside the highly regulated banking system, account for a large share of shadow banking social financing. The Chinese government has realized the seriousness of the problem, and introduces the release of Basel III from BCBS. We contribute to existing empirical analyses in several respects. First, prior studies on risk-sharing mostly either focus on the U.S. or European cases. Much less attentions are paid on China. This study intends to fill this gap by exploring the Chinese banks with the sample of 220 banks and the period 2000-2013. Second, we consider the influence of shadow banking. Under a high level of shadow banking may increase and/or companies’ leverage level, the more risky financial environment will be. Third, we consider the impact of opening of foreign banks’ RMB business.