股權結構對台灣商業銀行風險之影響

The Effect of Ownership Structure on Taiwanese Bank Risk-taking

張耿維(Keng-Wei Chang)

指導教授 ： 阮清萍

朝陽科技大學/管理學院/會計所/碩士(2010年)

摘要

在國際化與自由化的浪潮之下，銀行業風險管理議題越來越受到重視與檢討。本文主要希望更進一步探討股權結構與董事會結構如何影響台灣銀行業總風險，資產風險與盈餘風險。利用1996年至2008年之間的日、季、年資料，實證檢驗獨立董事制度、董事會規模、經理人的權限可否有效的控管風險。實證結果顯示，獨立董事未發揮風險控管之技能，而經理人的權力與董事會規模對資產報酬與盈餘風險控管的效果不明顯。本文同時也發現規模越大、交易頻率越高的銀行越願意承擔高風險。而高負債比率的銀行，盈餘波動反而越大，證明銀行業較不採用盈餘平穩方式，美化財報。

關鍵字

獨立董事 ； 銀行治理 ； 董事結構 ； 風險管理 ； 台灣銀行

並列摘要

The internationalization and liberalization of financial market has unleashed a new wave of financial risks all over the world. Taiwan’s banking industry, therefore, has to pay more and more attention in its risk management. This thesis addresses the question of how ownership structure and the board structure affects the banking total risk, asset risk and earnings risk during the period from 1996 through 2008 with quarterly and yearly data. The empirical results show that the independent directors do not effectively play their roles in managing risks. The risk management effectiveness of the directors’ power and the directors’ board on the assets and earnings risks are not obvious. It is also found that the larger the bank size and higher the frequency trading, the higher risk in Taiwan''s banking industry. Especially, results indicate that the higher debt ratio of banks, the greater volatility of earnings, implying the non- adaptation of earning smoothing to embellish the financial statements from the point of view of risk management.

並列關鍵字

Taiwan’s commercial bank ； risk management ； board structure ； bank governance ； independent directors

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