- 學位論文
銀行房貸業務、資訊不對稱與訂價策略
Banking Mortgage Loan, Asymmetric Information and Pricing Strategy
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摘要
本文採用修正的Chiappori and Salanié (2000)及Dionne et al. (2001)的計量方法，以檢驗資訊不對稱是否存在於銀行房貸市場。研究實證發現，銀行在面臨不同的貸款者或給予貸款者不同的貸款條件時，會產生資訊不對稱現象。特別是貸款者年齡趨於極端值時或貸款金額超過200萬，貸款戶易有道德危機產生。若銀行不管保障高低均給予貸款人高利率，將吸引到高風險貸款人產生逆選擇問題；高風險貸款人為了高利率的還款壓力而進行高風險投資，產生道德危機。此外，銀行欲直接以利率作為降低資訊不對稱的手段，效果有限，需配合一些授信條件才能有效降低資訊不對稱問題。
並列摘要
This paper demonstrates the existence of asymmetric information in the bank housing loan market. A large body of research papers examine whether the value of collateral mitigates the effect of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. We reexamine the variables of interest rate, whether the adjustment of pricing strategy in lenders helps to control the problems of asymmetric information. On the basis of the econometric model of and Dionne et al. (2001), we examine whether adverse selection or moral hazard exists in the housing loan market, and using Chiappori and Salanié (2000), we create a practical econometrics model to prove asymmetric information. That is, the models consider the generalized correlation between error terms form two bivariate models. This empirical finding supports the existence of asymmetric information; in particular, moral hazard exists mainly in the market and indeed interest rate can limitly release asymmetric information problem.
參考文獻
1.李桐豪、呂美慧 (2000)。金融機構房貸客戶授信評量模式分析-Logistic迴歸之應用。台灣金融財務季刊，1(1)，1-20。
2.汪琪玲 (2006)。台灣車體損失險契約中存在之資訊不對稱問題。台大管理論叢，16(12)，161-186。
7.蔡英哲 (2008)。不對稱訊息在台灣車體保險市場之研究。國立台灣大學財務金融研究所博士論文。
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