不動產抵押貸款違約代理因素研究

The Factors of Foreclosure and Agency Problem for Mortgage Loan

施鍠瑋(Huang-Wei Shih)

指導教授 ： 洪志興

朝陽科技大學/管理學院/財務金融系/碩士(2011年)

摘要

近年來房屋仲介公司或地政士在房屋貸款業務占有一重要地位，金融機構對房屋仲介公司介紹之貸款案件多給予一定之優惠，如較高之額度、利率加碼減低或減(免)收入證明文件。但房屋仲介業者為求買賣案件成交或代書為代尋貸款業務成功，是否會將單純為將客戶信用違約風險之轉移至金融機構，產生代理問題，或會替貸放者做初步篩選，以期將違約風險降低？本研究利用案件來源、收入證明、……等變數解釋呆帳損失金額及利率加碼，透過迴歸分析模型得知，客戶來源管道係由仲介或代書介紹之案件如發生完全違約而產生呆帳為三種來源之最，然其利率加碼卻為最低。一般說來，高風險資產應伴隨較高之風險溢酬，但國內金融業卻因市場競爭者眾多，彼此削價承做貸款業務下，出現利率訂價扭曲現象。因此金融機構如欲降低完全違約呆帳損失風險，便應改變此定價模式，對客戶來源管道重新審視，針對借款者的個別信用狀況予以評等，制訂出最適合的貸款契約，以期將借款者逾期還款的風險降至最低。

關鍵字

代理問題 ； 完全違約 ； 逾期還款 ； 不動產抵押貸款

並列摘要

The Real Estate broker and Land Administration Agent play a crucial role in mortgage loan market. The loans originated from real estate broker always have a certain favor that financial institutions give, just like higher loan amount, lower spread or less/no document. In order to make the transactions completely or search for the loans for customers successfully, Do they just simply transfer the default risk to financial institutions, and lead to the agency problem occurred, or they will make a initial selection about the customers for financial institutions to reduce the further default risk?
This study accounts for the bad loan loss and spread with the factors like distribution channel, income(finance) certification..., with Multiple Regression Model and finds out the bad loan loss will be the most that loans originated from real estate broker or land administration agent but the least spread they have. Generally, as we know higher risk asset should comply with higher risk premium, but over competition leads to pricing distortion in Taiwan. The financial institutions have to review the distribution channel of customers., evaluate their credits separately and develop the best contract to lower the risk of past-due loan occurred.

並列關鍵字

Foreclosure ； Past-Due Loan ； Mortgage Loan ； Agency Problem

參考文獻

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