隨著人類文明的發展,我們歷經了各式各樣的困境,金融危機更是屢見不鮮,雖然不會直接影響人們生命安全,但其背後所帶來的傷害更為沉重,常引發公司破產、社會恐慌等問題。因此在做財務決策時需更為謹慎,最好是在訊息足夠透明的情況下做抉擇,而不是因害怕受到更大的損害,而急於清算資產,或是貪心想賺取更多風險溢酬,而將自己陷於泥沼中。 本研究使用動態賽局回溯法,並考量投資人預期心理與景氣波動的考量下,探討債權人(銀行)面對公司財務困境時的清算決策行為。研究結果發現,當公司發生財務危機時,相較於「立即清算」或「以債換股」,債權人有較高的機率選擇「債務展延」策略。此結果不僅充分顯示決策的資訊價值,亦呼應Kahl(2002)的政策意涵,可提供政府、債權人及公司管理者之決策參考。
With the development of human civilization. We have experienced various dilemmas. The financial crisis is a common occurrence. Although it will not directly affect people's life safety, the harm caused by it is even heavier. Often lead to corporate bankruptcy, social panic and other issues. Therefore, one needs to be more cautious when making financial decisions, Instead of fearing more damage, rushing to liquidate assets, or greedy trying to earn more risk premiums trapping yourself in the mud. It is best to make choices when the message is transparent enough. This study uses backward induction. Under the consideration of investor's anticipation of psychological and economic fluctuations. This paper discusses the liquidation decision-making behavior of creditors facing corporate financial distress. The study finds that when a company experiences a financial crisis, the creditors have a higher chance of choosing a “Maturity Extension” strategy compared to “Immediate Liquidation” or “Debt-Equity Swap”. This result not only fully shows the information value of decision-making, but also echoes the policy implications of Kahl (2002). It can provide decision-making reference for government, creditors and corporate managers.