會計穩健性與獎酬制度之關聯研究

Relevancy Studies for Accounting Conservatism and Reward System

林家緯(Jia-Wei Lin)

指導教授 ： 陳俊宏

朝陽科技大學/管理學院/會計系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

本研究旨在探討會計穩健水準是否將影響主理人設計薪酬制度，以及彌補既有理論模型之缺漏，試著以建立一個連續型的模型來衡量不同的穩健水準下是否將設計不同的薪酬制度，才能使得代理成本降低。本研究理論模型在三項會計特性上，有諸多研究發現：第一，當會計穩健性越高且在「非底薪制」時，則代理人的越努力，績效薪資率制定越高，且在會計穩健性跨過特定門檻值，則會計穩健性對代理人的努力的影響倍增。當會計穩健性越高且在「底薪制」時，則代理人的努力水準與績效薪資率不變，但固定薪資則越高。第二，當實施會計中立原則，則代理人的努力水準與績效薪資率，其在「無底薪制」的水準為「底薪制」的一半，且在「底薪制」時，固定薪資為負。第三，當會計積極性越高且在「非底薪制」時，則會計積極性越強，則代理人的越不努力，績效薪資率制定越低，當會計積極性若過大時，將導致無均衡解。當會計積極性越高且在「底薪制」時，則代理人的努力水準與績效薪資率不變，但固定薪資越低。此研究提供管理當局一個制定獎酬契約及薪資制度時應考慮會計穩健水準的參考依據。

關鍵字

獎酬制度 ； 會計穩健性 ； 代理理論

並列摘要

This research aims to explore whether the level of accounting conservatism could impact the salary system designed by the principal in addition to compensating the gaps in existing theoretical models. This research tries to establish a continuous model to measure whether there is a need to design different salary systems under different conservatism levels. The model adopted in this research are set upon three different accounting policies and the findings of this research reveal that: First, the higher the level of accounting conservatism in addition to “non base salary system” then the harder the agent works the higher the performance salary ratio prescription would be. Moreover, when the accounting conservatism exceeds the threshold, the impact from accounting conservatism to the agent’s effort would multiply as well. The higher the level of accounting conservatism in “base salary system” with fixed agent effort level and performance salary ratio, then we would discover higher fixed salary level. Second, while implementing neutral accounting, the effort level and performance salary ratio for the principal at “non base salary system” would be half of that at “base salary system” in addition that the fixed salary would be in the negative column when in “base salary system”. Third, the higher the liberal accounting in “non base salary system” whereas in “non base salary system”, while implementing liberal accounting, then the lesser the agent would work and the lower the prescription for performance salary ratio; hence if there is excessive liberal accounting and this could result with a non-equilibrium solution. Thereby the higher the liberal accounting in “base salary system” with fixed effort level and performance salary ratio, then the lower the fixed salary would be. This research intends to provide as references for the governing authorities in prescribing the optimum salary and compensation so as to reach the balanced interests to lower the agency cost.

並列關鍵字

Reward system ； Accounting conservatism ； Agency theory

參考文獻

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