公司治理之資訊揭露與投資者信念關係之研究

A STUDY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCLOSING INFORMATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTOR’S BELIEF

黃獻德(Hsien-te Huang)

指導教授 ： 楊浩二

大同大學/經營設計學院/事業經營學系所/碩士(2004年)

摘要

「公司治理」，在恩隆、世界通訊爆發財務報表造假的醜聞後，許多媒體及投資機構都已視公司治理為評估企業是否值得投資的重要指標。國內證期會也要求新上市上櫃公司必須落實公司治理，公司治理似乎已成為企業發展的重要指標。
為了提高資料的回收率，個人投資者係透過證券及相關行業的人員將問卷送至各證券公司與分公司，然後委託營業員把問卷交給投資人回答，少數則交由朋友找尋平日有投資上市、上櫃公司股票買賣的人。此外，專業投資人員則交給華南金融控股公司、統一證券和建華證券公司。全部發送500份，回收有384份，有效問卷為308份，回卷率為61.6%。
公司在揭露訊息時往往好消息著墨較多，而壞消息則報導較少，不然就是好消息儘可能提早宣布，壞消息延遲公告、掩飾，甚至不公佈，如此一來，公司在訊息的揭露上往往扮演了操縱的角色，使得證券市場資訊的不對稱無法降低，而且公司以為透過媒體即可影響公司的股價，反而不致力於營運績效上的改善，因此公司如果期望股票能受到投資者的青睞，則應加強公司價值的增加。
本研究顯示投資者在做投資決策時相當依賴大眾傳播媒體。另外，若期望投資者有較理性的投資行為，則應增加和修訂法令，加強會計簽證公司、證券經紀商及投資顧問公司之功能，同時提高財務報表的資訊品質。

關鍵字

公司治理，資訊揭露，投資者信念

並列摘要

After the scandals of Enron and World Com, many media and investment institutions have regarded corporate governance as an important indicator for investment. Securities and Futures Commission also requests initially listed companies to put it into effect, in hence, corporate governance seems to be an important indicator to corporate development.
Population of this study is investors in Taiwan. In order to raise the response rate, the questionnaires were delivered to the investors through the help of securities related companies in Taiwan. In addition, professional analysts are commissioned to Hua Nan Holding Company, President Securities Company, and Sino Pac Securities Company. Of the 500 questionnaires delivered, 384 questionnaires were returned and 308 were usable with 61.6% effective response rate.
Corporate usually discloses more good news rather than bad ones, or announces good news early and bad news lately, and even dresses them up. By this way, corporate plays the role of information disclosure and seems unable to decrease information asymmetric in stock market. If corporate hopes its stock to be favored by investors, it should increase firm’s value and improve its performance.
The result shows that investors depend on mass media when they do investing decisions. Furthermore, expecting rational investing behaviors, the unit concerned should add new acts or amend the regulation, and enhance the functions of certified accountants, securities brokers, and investing advisors, and improve information quality of financial statement as well.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance ； information disclosure ； investor's belief

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