機構投資人持股對公司目標資本結構調整速度影響之研究

A study on the effect of institutional ownership shares on adjustment speed of target capital structure

葉時合(Shih-ho Yeh)

指導教授 ： 許明峰

大同大學/經營設計學院/事業經營學系所/碩士(2009年)

摘要

本研究是探討在股權結構中若機構投資人為大股東時，是否會對公司調整至目標資本結構的調整速度有所影響。以台灣上市公司為例，實證結果發現在單純考量公司財務特徵的情況下，會加快調整至目標負債比的速度，支持抵換理論，有一目標負債比存在。進一步探討是否有單一機構投資人為大股東，在市場價值或帳面價值觀點下，其調整至目標資本結構速度有明顯差異存在，顯示機構投資人和管理階層所偏好的目標負債比有所不同，易造成代理問題。
機構投資人為大股東時會參考本期負債比決定下一期目標負債比，以緩慢的速度將本期負債比調整至下一期的目標值，其融資決策行為支持抵換理論。在市場價值觀點下(考量股票市值對負債比影響)的調整速度較帳面價值較快，顯示股價波動會對調整速度造成影響，但不會使得目標負債比消失。當機構投資人為大股東時，受到流通在外股票市值及股價波動的影響，其融資決策行為會同時支持抵換理論和市場擇時理論。

關鍵字

代理問題 ； 資本結構 ； 機構投資人 ； 抵換理論 ； 市場擇時理論

並列摘要

This study is to research the impact from ownership structure on the adjustment speed of a firm’s target capital structure when the institutional investor is a large shareholder. Take the listed companies in Taiwan for example, empirical study found that the adjustment speed to a target debt ratio will be accelerated under the consideration of a firm’s financial characteristics. The evidences supported trade-off theory; there existed a target debt ratio. Further on, the study explores whether there is significant difference in the adjustment speed toward target capital structure in term of the market-based value or book-based value estimation when the single institutional investor is large shareholder. The result shows that the preferred debt ratios between institutional investor and management are different, causing the agency problem easily.
The debt ratio for the next period will be determined on the basis of current debt ratio when the institutional investor is large shareholder. The speed of the adjustment from current ratio toward the ratio for next period will be slow; its financial decision behavior supported the trade-off theory. Compared with book-based value estimation, the speed will be faster in term of the market-based value estimation (the influence of market value to the debt ratio is being considered). This shows that the volatility of the stock price would affect the adjustment speed, but the volatility would not make the target debt ratio disappeared. When the institutional investor is large shareholder, its financial decision behavior will be influenced by the market value and the volatility of the stock price. This result supports the trade-off theory and market timing theory at the same time.

並列關鍵字

market timing theory ； Agency problem ； Trade-off theory ； Capital structure ； Institutional ownership

參考文獻

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