本研究探討預防性醫療納入承保範圍時,存在道德風險的情況下是否會降低保險成本。本研究仿照洪乙禎 (2007) 建立一個兩期保險模型,並假設第一期的預防性醫療有可能降低第二期疾病發生的機率和發病的損失幅度,我們發現第二期的保險成本會降低,是因為預防性醫療會降低發病的損失幅度,而第一期的成本會增加,原因是預防性醫療是消費者的選擇行為,而不是一個隨機事件,消費者可能因為預防性醫療的使用變便宜了而增加使用量。但預防性醫療可降低發病的機率和降低生病發生損失的幅度效果勝於道德風險發生時的損失,所以將預防性醫療納入保險的承保範圍可以改善健康保險市場效率。
This paper explores the possibility of reducing health insurance costs under moral hazard when preventive treatment covered by insurance. We construct a two-period model of insurance based Hong (2007) and we assume that treatment in the first period may affect the probability and severity of being sick in the second period. Insurance coverage and treatment care level in the first period will be affected by their influence on second-period outcomes. We found that the cost of health insurance in the second period is reduced because preventive care to reduce the probability and the severity of illness. In the first period, the cost of health insurance is increased because preventive care can lead to moral hazard, since such preventive care is considered the consumer’s choice, not a random event. If preventive treatment covered by insurance generating function that reduced the probability and the severity of illness is greater than the loss of moral hazard effect, the insurance may improve the efficiency when preventive treatment covered by insurance.