獨立董事與經營判斷法則之研究

在公司治理架構中，我國向來為採取雙軌制度之國家。由於監察人監督成效不彰，向為各界所詬病。亞洲金融風暴後，各國政府紛紛開始重視公司治理區塊，我國亦於2006年正式將獨立董事與審計委員會制度明文引進證券交易法中。然而，由於我國公司董事會定位與美國本不相同。加上未釐清與監察人間差異。使其有權責不符之情形產生。針對此點，本文從制度、權責與免責三方面來探討，將我國獨立董事制度作一釐清並給予建議。就制度面來觀，因獨立董事人才不足，故在多家兼職情況下，造成其專業性無法發揮。未來除建構更完善之人才資料庫外，主管機關亦可敦請專業退休人員轉職以增加其數量。另外，2010年6月引進之新制「薪酬委員會」，未來應刪除強制設置之規定，並修正限由獨立董事擔任其成員為宜。權責問題上，在獨立董事身為董事會一員時，其定位應以兩方面看待：在業務決定方面，以監督立場，提供專業之建議；在業務具體執行方面，則以非執行業務身分監督執行之董事。在公司設有監察人情況下，其監督主要定位在於董事會內部監督，而監察人職司於外部財務監督。而在公司設置審委會取代監察人情形，其行使職權有利益衝突情況時，應將之列為即時公開事項。循此，未來應修正公司法第193條第2項規定，使獨立董事負有限過失責任，與內部董事做一區隔，使其能夠權責相符。在獨立董事注意義務方面，可區分為決策與監督看待：監督義務由於是獨立董事之職權核心，因此在該範圍以善良管理人注意義務標準相繩，可促使其致力於此；在商業決策義務方面，由於定位、時間與資訊取得問題之故，非其專門職司範疇，故應引進美國經營判斷法則(Business Judgment Rule, BJR)給予責任上保障，降低其受訴風險。循此，本文認為應區別內部董事，獨立董事為BJR適用之唯一對象。配套作法上，除了在證券交易法中明文引進BJR外，尚須配合修正我國公司法23條第1項規定，使董事受託義務內容更為完整。實務判決上，亦應從不同具體案例中妥善歸納獨立董事注意義務內涵與標準。在舉證責任方面法官應善盡民事訴訟法第199條第2項闡明規定。總結來說，在完整的制度、權責與免責體系下，獨立董事此外來制度方能真正落實於我國公司法制中，使我國公司治理架構更加完善。

關鍵字

獨立董事；審計委員會；薪酬委員會；權責相符；監督義務；經營判斷法則

並列摘要

Taiwan adopted the dual-track frame in Modern Corporate Governance. Because the Supervisor system was inefficiency, Taiwan has introduced the Independent Director and Audit Commission rules from American, which also has been made legislation in the Securities and Exchange Ac in 2006. But the position of Taiwan director board was partial different from American, which has an orientation towards executing the business decision, not supervise. Under this conflicted situation of rules, the authorities and duties of Independent Director in Taiwan was inconsistent with translation. Hence, the point of this article will focus on this problem, and make advices form the viewpoint of rules, authority, and eliminating personal liability. In the aspect of systems, there was a situation of lacking Independent Director of talent, which cause the incumbents had to hold two or more posts concurrently. Therefore, they had no time and vitality to bring their professional knowledge into full play. In order to solve this problem, this article recommended that the Financial Supervisory Commission can invite the professional retired public servant to sever as the candidates of Independent Director. At the same time, the official authorities also have to establish complete talent bank. Besides, the new rules of Remuneration Commission must be amended which should be established or not by the demand of listed Company. In the aspect of authority, when the Independent Director was in the character of the member of director board, must treat their authorities as two aspects: when the board make a business decision, they would offer their professional advice on the basis of the objective standpoint, and when the other directors execute the decision, the Independent Director must supervise them, who might violate the laws. In view of this, this article recommended that the Company Act should amend section 193-II to the percentage of responsibility of the Independent Director. Besides, we could assay the due care of Independent Director with two viewpoints: business decision and Supervision. The duty of supervision could be treat as the most central authority. Hence, the standard of “good administrator” would be an appropriate one for them. Contrary, the Independent Director did not have enough time to realize every single business decision and acquire consistent information due to their outside and objective stance. Therefore, it must have to provide the Business Judgment Rule (BJR) for them to reduce their risk of litigation. The ideal BJR supplementary measure should renew as follows: Amended the Company act section 23-I, establish the complete fiduciary duty of Independent Director; and the court also have to generalize the concrete and definite standard of the Independent Director`s duty of care from various cases; Moreover, when the court had applied the BJR, they must clearly expound the burden of proof between the plaintiff and defendant. Concluding from the above-mentioned, only the complete and definite Independent Director rules can really elaborate it`s effect, and to achieve preferable Corporate Governance.