政黨意識形態對台灣地區土地增值稅影響之研究

The Impact of Political Ideology on Land Value Increment Tax of Taiwan

何佳美(Chia-Mei Ho)

指導教授 ： 黃琝琇

嶺東科技大學/管理學院/高階主管企管碩士在職專班/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6823/LTU.2013.00048

摘要

本文以 2001年至 2010年台灣地區在「五都」行政區改制前原有的 23個縣(市)政府為實證分析對象，採用縱橫資料模型的分析方法，探討地方政府在不同政黨執政下，政黨因素是否影響台灣地區的土地增值稅有效稅率。由於土地增值稅具有累進效果的所得分配意義，原本是國民黨孫中山先生實現「平均地權」的政策工具，惟就政黨的意識形態而言，地利共享以實現社會公平，應屬偏向左翼之民進黨的政策目標，究竟何者政黨比較致力提升土地增值稅有效稅率，此為本文另一研究重點。
本文實證結果發現：政黨因素確實對土地增值稅有效稅率有顯著影響，而且國民黨執政縣(市)相較民進黨及其他政黨執政縣(市)，土地增值稅有效稅率較高；其次，公司登記現有家數對土地增值稅有效稅率有顯著負向影響，其肇因可能係受到樣本期間施行寬鬆性政策之影響，造成反閉鎖效應，而影響土地增值稅有效稅率；另人口密度對土地增值稅有效稅率具有負面影響、投機性政治景氣循環及修正財政統計量等對土地增值稅有效稅率具有正面影響，惟效果都不顯著。

關鍵字

土地增值稅 ； 政黨意識形態 ； 縱橫資料模型

並列摘要

This study employs the panel data model to analyze the relationship between the effective land value increment (LVI) tax rate, the ideology of political parties, and social-economic variables for 23 local governments in Taiwan over the period 2001-2010. The independent variables include the number of companies, population, political ideology, opportunistic political business cycle and the amended fiscal statistics. The aim of this study is to investigate whether political ideologies affect the effective LVI tax rate.
The empirical results show that political ideologies significantly affect the effective LVI tax rate. The effective LVI tax rate in the counties governed by the Kuomintang (KMT) is higher than that in the counties governed by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The number of companies negatively affects the effective LVI tax rate. The possible reason may be due to the anti-locking affect the effective LVI tax rate of the sample period. On the other hand, the population variable negatively affects the effective LVI tax rate, the opportunistic political business cycle variable and the amended fiscal statistics variable positively affect the effective LVI tax rate, but these effects are not significant.

並列關鍵字

Land value increment tax ； Political ideology ； Panel data model

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