公司治理與資本投資現金流量敏感性

Corporate Governance and Cash Flow Sensitivity of Investment

李鴻欣(Hung-Shin Lee)

指導教授 ： 陳俞如

亞洲大學/管理學院/會計與資訊學系/碩士(2008年)

摘要

許多研究證實在控制權集中的公司，控制股東會透過金字塔結構或參與管理的方式增加控制權，剝削小股東的利益，進而降低公司財富。除了控制股東透過各種方式直接或間接的剝奪小股東利益外，本研究主要在分析控制股東是否會影響公司資本投資現金流量敏感性。本研究使用控制股東控制權和現金流量權偏離大小代理公司治理風險，實證發現，控制股東控制權和現金流量權偏離程度愈大，公司資本投資現金流量敏感性愈大，此外，研究也發現，當控制股東同時為公司董事時，隨著控制股東控制權和現金流量權偏離程度愈大，公司資本投資現金流量敏感性愈大，也就是說，公司治理風險愈高的公司，公司資本投資現金流量敏感性愈大。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 資本投資 ； 控制權

並列摘要

Prior empirical evidence suggests that ownership concentration lead to the situation that the controlling owner will expropriate minority interests through enhancing their controlling rights by pyramid and management participations, which in turn undermines corporate values. Based on the view point of minority interest expropriation, this work attempts to investigate whether the ownership concentration will affect corporate cash flow sensitivity of investment. To probe into this question, we use a proxy variable, the divergence between the controlling rights and the cash flow rights to measure corporate governance risks. Our empirical findings suggest that corporate cash flow sensitivity of investment is significantly and positively related to the level of the corporate governance risks. Moreover, we also find that the controlling owner serving as the directors produces the similar positive effects on corporate cash flow sensitivity of investment. The results conclude that weak corporate governance will produce positive effects on corporate cash flow sensitivity of investment.

並列關鍵字

Corporate governance. ； Capital investment. ； Control rights.

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