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考慮存貨與運輸成本下買賣雙方合作賽局模式分析

A Cooperation Game Model for the Buyer-Seller of System the Inventory and Transportation Cost

摘要


買方與賣方之間由於資訊的不充分,往往造成無法做出最佳決策而導致成本過高或利潤減少的情形。以採購為例,買方通常基於採購成本極小化之目標來做出決策,此結果卻可能不是買賣雙方整體利潤極大化之最佳解。本研究除同時考慮買賣雙方之採購與存貨成本外,亦加入不同FOB交貨條件下之運輸成本因素,分別利用賽局理論中Stackelberg賽局與合作賽局,來說明傳統採購決策與合作採購決策間利潤關係的變化,建構出具體的數量化的模式,並推導出合作賽局之最佳參數範圍。研究結果顯示,賣方透過適當的利潤分享機制(例如:價格折扣),確實能夠同時增加買賣雙方的利潤。

並列摘要


Due to the insufficient information, the firms in the buyer-seller system often make sub-optimal decisions which diminish total profits of them. In this paper, we consider a scenario where the buyer has a monopolistic position for the product in a simple buyer-seller system. We attempt to investigate relationships between the buyer and the seller utilizing two different approaches which are Stackelberg's follower-leader game model and interactive cooperative game model. EOQ inventory control and FOB transportation condition are simultaneously considered in the cost framework while constructing these two game models. In the first model, a non-cooperative relationship (transaction) is assumed in which the seller (as the leader) makes the first decision and then the buyer (as the follower) makes its decision. In the second model, the leader-follower relationship is relaxed and a scenario is examined in which the seller and the buyer cooperatively maximize their joint system profit. We compare results between these two game models and discuss possible mechanisms, for example, a quantity discount scheme is developed to implement a profit sharing mechanism, which can be utilized to achieve more effective system cooperation.

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