我國壽險公司薪酬制度之探討－以代理理論觀之

The Study of the Compensation System of the Life Insurance Company form the Agency Theory Perspective

陳依婷(Yi-Ting Chen)

《中華技術學院學報》 31期 (2004/12) Pp. 295-311

https://doi.org/10.7095/JCIT.200412.0295

摘要

本研究旨在使用代理理論中的多工文獻，探討壽險公司在設計業務員之薪酬契約時，傳統薪酬指標（如業績FYP達成率、契約繼續率）以及加入近來強調的學界強調的品質性薪酬指標（如顧客滿意度），對於業務員行為的影響。研究結果發現：(l)僅有傳統薪酬指標，並不必然會引起業務員不重視中低需求顧客的問題。(2)在某些情況，僅有傳統薪酬指標並不會促使業務員進行品質提升努力，但壽險公司的因成本過高，並不會因此提高誘因。(3)在某些情況，僅有傳統薪酬指標雖會促使業務員進行品質提升努力，但壽險公司的成本亦因此提升，此時需要進依步考量是否引進品質薪酬指標。

關鍵字

代理理論 ； 壽險公司 ； 薪酬制度

並列摘要

This study explores how the traditional compensation indicators and the quality compensation indicators used by life insurance Company to evaluate life insurance agent through multi-task agency model. Our modeling analysis yields the following findings: (1) There are situation where in incentive only based on the traditional compensation indicators does not necessarily causes not to guide and assist customer s mo re greatly . In this situation, incentive place d on traditional compensation indicators is sufficiently large to motivate life insurance agent to guide and assist customers more greatly. (2) There are situation wherein only traditional compensation indicators would not make life insurance agent to do quality improvement, but Life Insurance Company will not enhance traditional compensation indicators because of high cost. (3) There are situation wherein only traditional compensation indicators would make life insurance agent to do quality improvement but life insurance company will have to bear high cost. Then we must consider the adding of qua lit y compensation indicators.

並列關鍵字

agency theory ； compensation system ； life insurance company