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Investigation of the Optimal IPO Underwriting Contract

股票上市最適承銷契約之探討

摘要


新股上市的承銷價格如何公平且合理的訂定,一直都是股票市場中一個相當重要的課題。本研究嘗試以契約理論中的逆選擇模型,建立一個最適的承銷契約機制。並透過契約的關係人:新股上市公司/承銷商/參與認購投資人三個層面,探討公開發行公司股票上市承銷時,由於訊息的不對稱所可能造成之所謂的損失及對整體社會福利的影響。此外,本研究並嘗試討論在此最適的契約條件之下,所可能產生的各種現象。

並列摘要


How to conclude a fair reasonable underwrite price of initial public offering stocks is always a very important issue in the stock market. This article try to quote the adverse selection model to establish an optimal underwrite mechanism. Besides, we investigates the dead weight loss caused from asymmetric information and the affect of social welfare caused by the underwriting contract via the tree-tier (The issuer/ The underwriters/ The retail investors participated in the IPO) hierarchical model of contract theory. Finally, we try to investigate the many phenomena caused by the optimal contract.

參考文獻


Chun-An Lee(1998).The Information Content of Seasoned Equity Offerings` Price Discount.Review of Securities and Futures Markets.10(1),123-151.
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Biais, B.,Bossaerts, P.,Rochet, J.C.(2002).An Optimal IPO Mechanism.Review of Economic Studies.69,117-146.

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