信用評等機構監理規範之發展與困境：問責基礎與利益衝突

Regulation of Credit Rating Agency: Accountability and Conflict of Interests

汪信君(Hsin-Chun Wang)

《臺大法學論叢》 42卷4期 (2013/12) Pp. 1333-1385

https://doi.org/10.6199/NTULJ.2013.42.04.03

摘要

於金融市場之運作中，信評機構對於受評公司以及投資標的（諸如信用衍生性金融商品以及抵押權擔保證券）所為評等之資訊，不僅對於債券發行人得有助於其籌集資金，亦同時使投資人得大幅省卻分析投資對象之資訊成本。惟當投資人所為投資決定，由於高度信賴信評機構所為評等之情形下，信評結果之正確性以及信評機構與受評對象間所涉及利益衝突之情形，都將進一步導致金融市場的穩定性甚而造成整體系統性風險。以2007年間由次級房貸市場所引發之金融市場危機為例，信評機構皆被認為是此次重大危機之肇因之一。因此於金融風暴後之金融市場監理改革中，美國、歐盟以及國際證券監理組織（IOSCO）皆相繼針對信評機構提出重大監理變革。本文之論述基礎，即建立於信評機構監理制度中所涉及關於問責基礎之薄弱以及信評機構與受評對象間利益衝突之問題。並再予論述目前國際間主要信評機構監理制度之改革方向分析其內容，並進而檢視其所可能面臨之障礙。

關鍵字

信用評等機構 ； 系統性風險 ； 次級房貸危機 ； 問責基礎 ； 利益衝突

並列摘要

In the financial market, the use of credit rating agencies to supply information concerning the credit worthiness of a corporation or financial products (such as credit derivatives and mortgage-backed securities) would facilitate the raising of capital for the issuers and reduce information cost for the investors. As credit rating agencies would significantly influence the decisions of the investors to assess credit risk, the accuracy of ratings and the issues regarding conflict of interests between the CRAs and the issuers would consequently lead to financial scandals and systemic risk.Since the global financial crisis began in 2007, it is evident that credit rating agencies have played an essential part in the collapse of the subprime mortgage market. In the wake of this crisis, several leading regulatory reforms in U.S and EU have been developed and implemented as well as other international organizations such as IOSCO. This article mainly focuses on the weakness of accountability of CRAs and conflict of interests between CRAs and the issuers. The main theme of this work is to analysis these current developments and to identify the major obstacles to improve the credit rating industry.

並列關鍵字

credit rating agency ； systemic risk ； subprime mortgage crisis ； accountability ； conflict of interests

參考文獻

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