臺海危機與美國對“反攻大陸”政策的轉變

The Taiwan Strait Crises and U.S. Attitude toward 'Reconquering the Mainland' in the 1950s

張淑雅(Su-Ya Chang)

《近代史研究所集刊》 36期 (2001/12) Pp. 231-290

https://doi.org/10.6353/BIMHAS.200112.0231

摘要

「反攻大陸」是中華民國政府（簡稱國府）遷臺後念玆在玆的目標，也是國府在臺灣的基本國策。冷戰高峰期間，支持國府、不承認中共的美國，對國府這個基本政策的立場究竟爲何？本文仔細分析美國在1950年代兩次臺海危機期間對「反攻大陸」政策所做的深入思考，並指出：美國從未打算支持國府反攻，但爲了牽制中共，一直不願公開反對此政策。至1954-1955年第一次臺海危機期間，由於擔心國府趁機擴大衝突，美國才開始仔細思考有關反攻的問題，結果是要求國府不可憑武力硬性反攻，而是要「待機反攻」，也就是將自己塑造成一股可以隨時出動的力量，等局勢有利時把握機會取代中共。第二次臺海危機爆發後，美國將「待機反攻」的想法進一步推演，構思了讓「反攻大陸」精神化的說詞，要國府扮演中國文化的守衛者，以爭取大陸民心，作爲日後重掌政權的基礎。由於國府早就聲明反攻革命是「三分軍事、七分政治」，也一向以爭取大陸民心爲要務，故蔣介石在危機末期與來訪的美國國務卿發表聯合公報，聲明反攻主要途徑「爲實行孫中山先生之三民主義，而非憑藉武力。」美國的說詞或許並未立即改變國府有關反攻大陸政策的實質，但徵諸1960年代中期後，國府大力推動的「中華文化復興運動」及「三民主義統一中國」口號，美國的想法對國府應有相當長遠的影響。

關鍵字

臺海魚機 ； 八二三砲戰 ； 反攻大陸 ； 杜勒斯 ； 蔣介石

並列摘要

Ever since its retreat to Taiwan, the ultimate goal of the National Government of the Republic of China (NGRC) was to ”Return to the Mainland” or to ”Reconquer the Mainland.” The United States, the main sponsor of the NGRC in the 1950s, never intended to help the aging Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in fulfilling his ”dream.” Washington, however, maintained public ambiguity over such slogans in the hope they would help to contain the ”Red Chinese”. Such a deliberate ambiguity was challenged when the Communists launched the first shelling campaign against Quemoy in September 1954. Through this and then the next Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958, Washington was forced to think hard about the ”Reconquering the Mainland” slogan. It first decided to advice Taipei to prepare itself as ”a force of opportunity” ready to take over the mainland when circumstances became favorable, rather than planning on retaking the mainland by force. Then, in 1958, Washington depicted a new role for the Nationalists-to be the ”custodian of Chinese culture and values,” so that it could appeal to the Chinese people when the Communist regime was on the verge of collapse. Since Chiang Kai-shek had been stressing that the task of reconquering the mainland relied mainly on political, rather than military, means, he agreed to reiterate it in a joint communiqué with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In that pronouncement, it was said that the principle means of successfully liberating the Chinese people ”is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles and not the use of force.” Judging from the enormous efforts by the NGRC in promoting the ”Restoration of Chinese Culture” since the mid-1960s and the ”Reunification through the Practice of the Three People's Principles” since the 1970s, Washington's design perhaps had a lasting impact over the essence of the NGRC's policy to ”Reconquer the Mainland.”

並列關鍵字

Taiwan Strait Crisis ； Reconquer the Mainland ； Return to the Mainland ； John Foster Dulles ； Chiang Kai-shek

參考文獻

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