清乾隆朝的稅關與皇室財政

乾隆朝許多關差為內務府包衣出任，其關稅解交戶部採定額制，盈餘歸皇帝所有。皇室收入因十八世紀中俄貿易增加，乾隆26年(1761)，俄國在恰克圖的貿易額為l,011,067盧布，嘉慶5年(1800)達到8,383,846盧布，增加八倍以上。中國與俄國貿易的稅關為張家口，盈餘由16,000兩增到3萬兩，崇文門盈餘由7萬多兩增至14萬兩。可見中俄貿易量的成長，皇室獲益良多。其次，乾隆皇帝更改雍正皇帝所訂火耗制度，火耗佔正額比例由30%至50%降為10%。看起來好像減輕百姓負擔，實際上，各稅關監督為因應辦貢、辦公經費不足，向乾隆皇帝提出增收平餘銀等權宜措施。在皇帝看來，這些新增稅目只佔戶部關稅的10%左右，為錙銖所蓄成果，不足為患。以道格拉斯•諾思的理論來說，君主專制時期，統治者追求個人最大利益；在中國，皇帝藉助包衣來擴展其財產權。稅關解交內務府的盈餘、新增稅目，以及人參、玉石變價等收入，每年利潤約在60萬兩至80幾萬兩，皇室財政收入大約佔關稅收入的15%至20%，顯示乾隆皇帝藉助包衣來擴展財產權的具體事例。關稅新增項目繁雜，令人無所適從，讓官員有機會貪污。譬如粵海關監督鄭伍賽增收火耗稅率、安寧私自增加平餘銀的稅率等。最初，皇帝用抄家方式來處分貪污犯罪，後來發現抄家不足以彌補官員虧空銀兩的損失，又發明一套議罪制度，讓官員及其父兄子姪賠補。再者，官員虧欠銀兩應屬政府稅收，當交戶部，但是皇帝卻命令繳交內務府。皇帝為自己荷包著想，官員上行下效，貪污風氣延續到清末，遂成為清朝衰敗的主要原因。

關鍵字

稅關；內務府；貪污

並列摘要

During the reign of the Qianlong Emperor, bondservants of the Imperial Household Department staffed many customs houses. The customs duties they levied were delivered to the Ministry of Revenue, while the emperor received the ”surplus” revenue. The imperial income rose due to an increase in trade between China and Russia in the eighteenth century. For example, the trade through Kiakhta in the 26(superscript th) year of Qianlong's reign (1761) was 1,011,067 rubles, increasing eightfold to 8,383,846 rubles in the 5(superscript th) year of Jiaqing's reign (1800). At the customs house for Sino-Russian trade in Kalgan the surplus increased from 16,000 to 30,000 taels, and at Chongwen Gate receipts rose from 70,000 to 140,000 taels. It is obvious that the Qing emperors benefited greatly from Sino-Russian trade. Furthermore, Qianlong modified the meltage-fee system enforced by Emperor Yongzheng, reducing the rate from 30-50% (of the principal taxes) to 10%. This reduction apparently lessened the financial burden on the populace, but in fact, every customs superintendent resorted to a variety of fiscal expedients such as surcharges to compensate for the quality of silver or to cover the cost of tribute or budget shortfalls. In the emperor's view, these newly added levies were only about 10% of the Ministry of Revenue's custom receipts. According to Douglas North's neoclassical theory of the state, an absolute monarch will maximize private advantage. Indeed, the Qing emperors expanded their personal wealth with the aid of bond servants. The Imperial Household Department's income from customs surplus, miscellaneous levies, and the sale of ginseng and precious stones was estimated at 600,000 to 800,000 taels per annum, or about 15-20% of the total customs revenue. Surcharges added to customs levies were too numerous to calculate and provided many opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. For example, Zheng Wusai, the superintendent of Yuehai Customs, raised the meltage fee rate, and An Ning hiked the surcharges to compensate for the quality of silver without permission, among many other cases. At first, Qianlong confiscated the properties of such embezzlers, but these properties were insufficient to compensate for the losses from peculation. As a result, the emperor established a system of punishment that obligated the embezzlers and their paternal relatives to repay the losses. Although the money that the bureaucrats owed to the government should have been paid to the Ministry of Revenue, the emperor ordered the payments to be handed over to the Imperial Household Department. As the emperor set this selfish example, so the bureaucrats followed suit. This pattern of corruption lasted until the end of the Qing dynasty and was a major cause of the Qing's decline.