半總統制是新興民主國家廣為採用的政府制度類型,而現有關於半總統制的研究不論是著重憲法規範或實證行為面向,對於總統常態性的政策權限設計和相關的決策機關配置的系統性探討較為欠缺。本文試圖藉由包括臺灣在內共 21 個半總統制民主國家憲法設計的探索,讓半總統制的研究和理論能觸及總統常態性的治理課題,是半總統制研究中的新嘗試。本文焦點在於系統性解析多個國家憲法中總統的政策權與決策機關之設計模式,並進一步探討其與半總統制憲法上的次類型和實際的運作類型之關係。藉由多國案例的分析,本文呈現了重要而豐富的研究發現。研究核心發現在於,當總統具有特定政策權限時,憲法也大都配置政策諮詢或決策機制,而總統是否具主持內閣會議(或部長會議)權限,並與半總統制之憲法類型和實務類型都有一定的關聯性,因此,從「誰主持內閣會議」這個問題切入,可以相當程度辨識出該國憲法設計之原意,是讓其半總統制的行政權中樞傾向在總統或總理身上。最後,本文也對臺灣的相關憲法設計,提出了延伸的討論和思考。
Semi-presidentialism has been a popular form of government in emerging democracies. However, systematic analyses on the presidents’ powers in policy-making or on the related mechanisms of their decision- making process have been scarce. To fill in the gap in the field, this article surveys the experiences of 21 democratic countries. With a focus on constitutional design of president’s powers in policy and decision-making mechanisms, this article also tries to discover their relationship with sub- types of semi-presidentialism. The results showed that the president’s power is crucial to political accountability of the government. When a country’s constitution does not explicitly give powers of policy making to its president, its constitutional system seems to fall into a type of premier-presidential. Finally, this article reflects some opportunities and challenges for constitutional design in Taiwan.
日本已分別在外交、防衛與警政等體系下設置不同任務屬性之情報機關。然而在經過數十年運作後,現存情報組織上已無法充分發揮機能。隨著冷戰及九一一事件之後國際局勢的劇烈變化,非傳統安全威脅日益升高,以及日本欲積極發揮其在國際上之影響力,朝向正常化國家邁進等,使得現存的情報體制面臨變革,必須強化情報機能,以作為日本達成前述目標之後盾。政府與民間有識之士對此一方向亦有深切體認,分別提出許多強化情報機能的改革建議,例如強化情報機構之聯繫、加強情報蒐集能量及提升情報研析水準..
Japan has various intelligence agencies that carry out different tasks under the diplomatic, national defense and police systems. After several decades in operation, these agencies have become less capable of fulfilling their functions. The end of the Cold War and the 911 terror attack have sparked a string of sea changes in international dynamics. Increasing non- traditional security threats, Japan’s ambition to exert bigger international influences, its bid for a normal state, all these issues have made reform necessa..
半總統制的設計,通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下,由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施,國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量,則在文獻上甚少探討,也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國,並從較傳統的制度面切入,來探究兩國在制度設計安排上,賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排,主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..
The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..
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